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NOTES ABOUT INTRODUCTION 
 
Management contracts are agreements by which a company assigns its management –
partially or entirely- to another company, in order that the latter will exercise it for the 
benefit of the first, while the latter will receive a payment for the provision of such 
services. 
Management contracts belong to the broad category of business (B2B) agreements and to 
the sub-category of services’ provision B2B contracts.  
They have a significantly long-term character and by them the management provider 
acquires the role, powers, duties –fiduciary as well- and responsibilities of the board of 
directors of the recipient, while the latter contributes to the contractual relationship the 
whole or part of its undertakings. On the other hand, in modern management contracts, 
the provider also invests in the relationship capital, know-how, significant human 
resources and most importantly its own brand name. The relationship between the 
parties is characterised by a strong cooperative element, by great interdependence, as the 
whole relationship is based on a win-win strategy and by a highly customised content 
and structure. Management contracts are always explicit –written- and very detailed 
contracts –due to their scope, nature and the interests involved in them-, although a large 
set of contractual terms and obligations is frequently implicit and while the content of 
specific terms –explicit or implicit- is under constant negotiation, follows the 
relationship’s evolution and depends on different changing factors. Moreover, there are 
no standard management contract terms, as each contract’s terms depend also on specific 
variables. Generally, the content of management contracts is frequently complimented by 
other contracts –the nature of which depends on the specific scope of each management 
contract-, deriving from the primal one, which functions as the framework of rules that 
govern a more complex relationship (incomplete contracts). 
Relational Contracts Theory is a theory mainly developed by Iain MacNeil in U.S.A. some 
decades ago and has been the object of theoretical research in common law jurisprudence 
ever since. This theory contrasts legal formalism to a certain extent and is based on the 
assumption that all the contracts can fall along a relational range from discrete –mere 
transaction- to highly relational, although no relation can be totally separated from 
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relational elements; the isolation of the contract from a relational context and the 
complete and exact planning of the relationship ex ante (presentiation), although having a 
great importance for contracts law, cannot explain totally modern contractual 
relationships. Highly relational contracts are these, the effect of which is strongly based 
on a specific social and economic context, on an ongoing relation (usually of trust) 
between the parties, which influences the scope and content of the contract. This entire 
context that “hides” behind the contract may help us understand and explain the 
contractual content. MacNeil’s work was supported by other researchers, who 
contributed to the relational contracts theory and it had a significant impact on economic 
literature. Some other major points of that theory is the effect of constant (re)negotiation, 
the resolution of conflicts between the parties, the interaction between agents in modern 
business contracts (as the contracted parties are mostly companies governed by agents), 
the importance of the concept of the “exchange” as the terminus for modern contracts 
and of course the contractual norms. 
According to relational contracts theory, relations are governed by a set of common 
characteristics (norms) that play an important role, regarding the content of the relation, 
the formation of parties’ obligations and the actual operation of the contracts. These 
norms are based on a set of internal values and the broad context social and economic 
factors, related to the relation. According to MacNeil, there are ten norms common for all 
kinds of contracts:   role integrity, reciprocity, implementation of planning, effectuation of 
consent, flexibility, contractual solidarity, the ‘linking norms’ (restitution, reliance and 
expectation interests), creation and restraint of power, propriety of means and 
harmonisation with the social matrix1. There are also five norms (additional or the same 
as these of common contracts), responding in an intensive way to contracts with a highly 
relational character than conventional contracts: role integrity, preservation of the relation 
(expansion of contractual solidarity), harmonisation of the relational conflict, 
supracontract norms and propriety of means. 
                                                
1
 MacNeil also suggests one norm that enhances discreteness and presentiation, applying mostly to conventioanal-
transactional contracts. New Social Contract, 60. 
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Other authors, such as Austen-Baker, allthough supported the concept of norms, 
proposed simpler and more comprehensive norms models. 
Relational contracts theory, according to the literature, can constitute –among its other 
scopes- a valuable tool, in order to describe and explain the operation and the content 
especially of the contracts, which could be defined as highly relational. Furthermore, it 
seems quite interesting to try to apply this theory to a specific kind of relation.The general 
goal of this work is to test whether the theory of the norms can be actually used, in order 
to approach a type of contractual relation and whether the norms can be actually related 
to the content of a type of contract. Management contracts include some characteristics 
that make us choose them as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory 
and specifically of the theory of the norms. They are long-term and highly customised, 
they concern B2B relations and they are characterised by close cooperation and 
interdependence.  
Management contracts and specifically the content of the parties’ obligations in 
management contracts will constitute the object of our research, while relatioanl contracts 
theory and specifically the theory of the norms will constitute the methodological tool 
that we will use, in order to explain and define the content of these obligations.  
This research is designed to test the application of the norms theory to management 
contracts’ obligations.  
Our main research question is the following: 
“Is it possible to relate the parties’ obligations deriving from a management contract to specific 
norms?” or “Is it possible to explain the content of these obligations by using the norms theory?” 
The above key question can be analysed in some specific subsidiary questions.  
Two of them refer to relational contracts theory and are examined in the relevant chapter: 
a) Which different models of norms exist in modern relational contracts theory? 
b) Which are the contractual norms and what is their individual content and scope?  
Two of them refer to management contracts and are examined in the relevant chapter: 
c) What is the content of the relation between the parties in a management contract and 
which are the factors that govern this relation? 
d)  Why do the management contracts have a high relational element? 
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The other five subsequent questions are examined in the main chapter of our research: 
e) What norms apply to each obligation and why? 
f) What norms apply solely to unilateral or bilateral obligations and what norms apply to 
the total range of obligations of a management contract and why? 
g) How often does each norm appear in these obligations and which norms appear more 
or less? (Which norms are mostly related to the content of these obligations?) 
h) How these results change if you used an alternative norm model and to which 
conclusions does this fact lead us? Do some norms overlap or is their content often 
absorbed by other norms? 
i) How effectively do the norms succeed in conveying each obligation’s content? 
Regarding our specific methodology, we have to note that we examine management 
contracts as a paradigm for the actual application of norms theory. Specifically, we 
examine management contracts as an example of business contract in which the element 
of close and long-term cooperation between the parties, their interdependence and 
general correlation of interests are very strong (we will explain in the relevant chapter 
why this is the case). So, by examining then relation between norms and management 
contracts, we try to investigate the significance of the norms theory in contracts in which 
cooperation and interdependence are highly apparent.  
Moreover, by examining the obligations of the parties in management contracts, we 
actually examine the overall content and the terms of this relation. By distinguishing 
between unilateral and bilateral obligations, we try to find out if the value of the norms is 
limited to one category or the other –meaning whether the norms apply to the contractual 
terms that concern both parties or apply to terms referring to each party’s individual role- 
and whether different norms apply to different sets of obligations. Furthermore, we 
choose to apply the extensive MacNeil’s model instead of a simpler model of fewer 
norms, in order to secure an extensive norms-based analysis and avoid any failure in 
depicting slight differences between different obligations’ relation to certain norms (i.e. 
although a norm of a simple model may appear in two obligations, a specific norm of the 
extended model –that belongs to the simple norm- may not appear in both cases), 
although we also present our results by using a simpler model as well. Besides, we do not 
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use in our norms model some concepts such as linking norms and presentiation, because 
of their very broad –and maybe obscure as well- and therefore non-practical for such an 
analysis, meaning, their content’s absorption by other norms and the fact that according 
to some authors they cannot be assumed as stand-alone norms. On the other hand, we 
use flexibility, although Austen-Baker assumes it as an “essential component in all the 
norms”2, as we try to test his assumption. We also use for our analysis 12 obligations, 
which are very common in management contracts, while we do not use management 
obligation, for practical reasons, which we will explain before the analysis. We do not 
claim that all these obligations exist in every management contract or that there may not 
be more special obligations, however we chose this set on the grounds that they are firstly 
easily distinguishable and second very common (and surely for reasons of briefness as 
well).  
Our analysis’ structure is the following: we present each obligation separately, we briefly 
explain its content and then we relate it to each of the applying (to it) norms. Our results 
are presented in the relevant table-Appendix, in which we also “translate” the results by 
using the simple model’s norms. Then we restate our results in a different way, as we 
present each norm’s appearances in every obligation, set of obligation and totally, also 
using the simple model’s norms as well. 
                                                
2
 Austen-Baker, R., "Comprehensive Contract Theory: A Four Norm Model of Contract Relations" (2009) 25 Journal 
of Contract Law,  219-220 
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The table below depicts the structure of our research and related it to its goal and questions. 
 
GOAL STRUCTURE 
To test whether the theory of 
the norms can be actually 
used, in order to approach a 
type of contractual relation 
and whether the norms can 
be actually related to the 
content of a type of contract 
THEORY 
PRESENTATION 
 
(METHODOLOGY) 
LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
(OBJECT) 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
(APPLICATION) 
KEY QUESTION 
 “Is it possible to relate the 
parties’ obligations deriving 
from a management 
contract to specific norms?” 
or “Is it possible to explain 
the content of these 
obligations by using the 
norms theory?” 
RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTS 
THEORY AND 
CONTRACTUAL 
NORMS 
 
THE RELATIONAL 
CHARACTER OF 
MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACTS 
ANALYSIS OF THE OBLIGATIONS 
FROM MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 
UNDER A RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTS THEORY NORMS 
FRAMEWORK 
SUBSIDIARY 
QUESTIONS 
a) Which different models 
of norms exist in modern 
relational contracts 
theory? 
b) Which are the 
contractual norms and 
what is their individual 
content and scope?  
 
c) What is the content 
of the relation between 
the parties in a 
management contract 
and which are the 
factors that govern this 
relation? 
d)  Why do the 
management contracts 
have a high relational 
element? 
 
e) What norms apply to each obligation and 
why? 
f) What norms apply solely to unilateral or 
bilateral obligations and what norms apply 
to the total range of obligations of a 
management contract and why? 
g) How often does each norm appear in 
these obligations and which norms appear 
more or less? (Which norms are mostly 
related to the content of these obligations?) 
h) How these results change if you used an 
alternative norm model and to which 
conclusions does this fact lead us? Do some 
norms overlap or is their content often 
absorbed by other norms? 
i) How effectively do the norms succeed in 
conveying each obligation’s content? 
 
 9
CHAPTER A: RELATIONAL CONTRACTS THEORY AND 
CONTRACTUAL NORMS 
 
 
First Approaches towards Relational Contracts 
 
 
Gilmore, in “The Death of Contract”3 presents his central thesis that the law of contracts, 
at least as it existed in the 20th century United States was almost artificial. According to 
Gilmore, changes in the business practice are occurring more rapidly than changes in 
contract law theories and this reality may make the theoretical foundations of contract 
law out of date. According to this theory a contract cannot be assumed as a separate idea 
and the breach of contract could be regarded just as another tort. 
As opposed to the above, a new trend in contract law was gradually developed by 
scholars, who thought that contracts still have a reason for existence, as they play an 
important social and economic role, in the general context of social relations. Relational 
Contracts Theory appears to grow out of the empirical work by Macaulay4 and Beale and 
Dugdale and by the theoretic legal research of I.R. McNeil, who is accredited with the 
initial use of the term “relational contract”.  
Macaulay investigated the issue of non-legal norms in certain industries and finds that 
contract law is often ignored in business transactions. The parties often choose not to use 
a “complete” contract, as the counterparty has become a necessary partner during the 
evolution of the relation. Therefore, bargaining power is something that alters and 
changes, as a relationship develops and exchanges may be adjusted informally during the 
life of the contractual relationship5. Furthermore Macaulay states6 that in relational 
transactions the parties prefer not to terminate the contract, but to re-arrange it as to 
make continuation of performance feasible. Negotiation has a primary role in business 
relations, as adjustment of exchange relationships and dispute settlement by litigation is 
costly. The non-legal norms mentioned by Macaulay may be interpreted as part of the 
                                                
3
 G. Gilmore, The Death of Contracts (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State UP, 1974) 
4
 S. Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”, (1963) 28 American Sociological 
Review, 55 
5
 ibid.  58 
6
 ibid,  63 
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occupational morality of businessmen and under some circumstances some of these 
emerging non-legal norms may supersede the law of contract.  
Beale and Dugdale’s7 later empirical research confirmed the above. It showed that parties 
used to agree expressively only on their primary obligations, while tacit planning 
prevailed concerning the details of their relation. Detailed planning for contracts was 
assumed as expensive, contract law was often ignored concerning planning their 
relationship and trust between firms and reputation were seen as essential. Mutually 
accepted norms were used more often than contract law and legal remedies were avoided 
as inflexible.  
The above researches were conducted independently –although almost simultaneously- 
from McNeil’s work and offered an empirical material for the latter’s theoretical 
approach. 
 
McNeil’s Relational Contracts Theory 
 
The core of McNeil’s Theory 
 
McNeil’s Focus 
 
On the other hand, McNeil developed a theory, according to which the traditional 
“classical” and neoclassical approach of doctrinal contract law in the common law 
countries, focuses on the discreet character of contracts, viewed more as specific spot 
deals, distinguished from the overall environment in which they evolve8. He also argues 
that under current contracts law, every specific type of contracts is governed by its own 
specific rules, while general theory is only implemented in new and novel contractual 
situations.  
                                                
7
 H. Beale and T. Dugdale, “Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies”, (1975) 
2 British Journal of Law and Society, 45 
8I. R. Macneil, “Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation”, (1974) 60 Virginia Law Review, 589 
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McNeil mainly focuses more on the exchange phenomenon and on behavioural aspects of 
contracting. He avoids treating any governance models of exchanges (such as other 
relational theories mainly introduced by economic theories) and the core of his work is 
related to the social environment and the norms of behaviour that exist within every 
framework of exchange.  
 
Transactions & Relations 
 
MacNeil firstly distinguishes between “living contracts”, meaning the actual contractual 
relations and “contracts at law”, the legal tools used in order to govern relations and 
disputes9. He suggests that contracts should better not assumed as mere transactions but 
as belonging in the complex context of some overall exchange relations.10 However, he 
underlines that some relations are far more relational than others. Contract relations fall 
along a relational range from the highly relational, such as long-term employment 
contracts to the almost discrete, which concerns largely transactionalized relations, such 
as spot purchases of commodities. Even in these occasions, however, these discreet 
transactions are attached to a general environment of social relations, thus a relational 
element is always present, in order to manage to explain a contract and almost no 
contract should be assumed as totally discrete. Most of the modern exchange relations are 
characterised by11: 
a) close personal relations, where reputation, a sort of morality and interdependence 
play a crucual role 
b) the involvement of many individual and collective poles odf interest 
c) significant duration 
d) an object that includes both measurable and non-measurable quantities 
                                                
9
 I. R. Macneil, “Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries”, (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law 
Review, 877, 901 
10
 I. R. Macneil, “The Many Futures of Contracts” (1974) 47 Southern California Law Review, 691 
11
 I. R. Macneil, “Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation”, 595. 
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e) a more conmmon sharing and a less common allocation of relational 
responsibilites, risk and benefit  
f) a limited binndingness 
Macneil, in order to offer some indicators of the contrast between transactions and 
relations, presents twelve axes that vary from extremely relational to extremely 
transactional:  
1) overall relationship type  
2) measurability and actual measurement 
3) basic sources of socio-economic support 
4) duration 
5) commencement and termination 
6) planning 
7) degree of future cooperation required in post-commencement planning and 
performance 
8) incidence of benefits and burdens 
9) obligations undertaken 
10) transferability 
11) number of participants 
12) participant views12. 
The above axes show some important descriptive elements of a contractual relation of 
any type.  
As appears, MacNeil mainly focuses on business relations and commercial exchanges, 
however the above ideas are totally related to the whole spectrum of contracts law. 
According to MacNeil, the law of contract roles and legal positions allows modern people 
to choose among positions and behavioural standards, created and safeguarded by the 
state.13 
 
 
                                                
12
 ibid, 738-740 
13
 ibid, 743 
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Towards a Relational Contracts Theory 
 
In this way, this theory, which is named after its core –relations-, as a relational contracts 
theory (or essential contracts theory) opposes legal formalism theory, which focuses 
mainly on the express terms of a contract and almost ignores every issue arising from the 
overall context of the contractual relation, except of some issues that may be the basis for 
a limited series of implied terms.  On the other hand, this approach is also opposed to the 
theory about "death of contract", which was described above. McNeil himself describes 
the relational contracts law as a system that does not exist in U.S.A., which replaces the 
neoclassical system. We should however note that by using the term “relational” McNeil 
means two different things. Firstly, he means that every contract may be related to a 
given social context, a context that is very simple but even apparent even in mere 
transactions. Secondly, he means that some contracts, especially these concerning 
business relations, may involve a complex and on-going relationship between parties, a 
relationship that unavoidably influences the function of these contracts. 
MacNeil’s theoretical approach starts with “Whither Contracts”, a paper presented before 
the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in 1967 or 1968. By this 
paper MacNeil opposes Grant Gilmore’s ideas about the “death of contracts” as then 
promoting the view that there was no such thing as ‘contracts’. By stating that “contract 
exists14”, Macneil's bases his relational contract theory on the argument that contracts 
should neither be subsumed into torts, nor assumed as individual entities. Concerning 
the second conclusion, MacNeil underlined the essential bankruptcy of conventional 
contract theory and stated that we should focus on the contracting as a phenomenon and 
not on separate exchanges and that there can be no unique law that could govern every 
contract .  
Having determined the core of MacNeil’s arguments, we further proceed to the main 
aspects of his theory. 
                                                
14
 I.R. Macneil, “Whither Contracts?” (1969) 21 Journal of Legal Education 403, 418-419. 
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The Main Aspects of McNeil’s Theory 
 
Presentiation 
 
Firstly, one key aspect of MacNeil’s work has to do with the ideas of presentiation and 
discreteness. In “Restatement…”15 he argues that presentiation has a great importance 
for overall contracts law16 and that it is a tool for the examination of traditional contract 
systems17. Actually the entire conventional doctrine of contracts law is based on 
presentiation, thus on the idea that the initial contractual agreement has to be as complete 
as possible in order to be able to resolve and answer by itself to any future problem. 
McNeil describes discreteness as “the antithesis” of the integration into a relation18  and 
a discrete transaction system as a system in which a resolution of the conflict between 
stability and flexibility results to the fall of risks on suppliers of goods and services. 
According to McNeil discreteness and presentiation mean that an exchange is totally 
consented, planned and isolated from any other aspect of the present and future social 
and relational context. It may be possible to presentiate in transactions with a powerful 
discreet and transactional element; however it is very difficult to achieve this when the 
contract is more relational, as the original agreement will be difficult to answer every 
problem about the ongoing relation. The conventional English contract law has 
developed the idea of implied terms, in order to “rescue” the idea of presentiation, thus 
enables the solution of problems in more “relational” relations, without rejecting the 
original deal between the parties, by assuming that although their agreement did not 
include such terms, they actually implied them; therefore these terms also constitute a 
presentiated part of the original agreement. 
                                                
15
 According to Oxford Dictionary presentiate means “to make or render present in place or time, to cause to be 
perceived pr realised as present”. 
16 I. R. Macneil, “Restatement”, 592 
17
 ibid, 592. 
18I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and 
Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review, 858. 
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Relational Contracts 
 
In “The Many Futures of Contracts”19, MacNeil defines transaction as “an event sensibly 
viewable separately from other events accompanying it temporally – one engaging only 
small segments of the total personal beings of the participants.’ 20, in “Restatement” 
contract as ‘a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, 
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty’ and promise as a 
“manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way”. In another 
article, McNeil redefines contract as “relations among people who have exchanged, are 
exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the future”21, a definition that shows the 
McNeil’s focus on contracts as generators of future exchanges. McNeil, by referring to 
promise is actually referring to contracts at law that are distinguished from living 
contracts, which are related to the general context of social relationships. 
According to McNeil, nowadays relation prevails against transaction22, as far as 
contractual behaviour is concerned. All kinds of relations belong to a broader social 
context with which the contractual relations have to be harmonized, in order to be 
successful. In “The New Social Contract”23 McNeil suggests a model, which can adapt 
the conventional contracts model to relational contracts. This model is analyzed in eight 
parts:  
1) measurement and specificity 
2) sources of contractual solidarity 
3) planning 
4) sharing and dividing benefits 
                                                
19
 “The Many Futures of Contracts” is the second article by Macneil about relational contract and it constitutes along 
with “The New Social Contract” his best-known works on relational contracts. 
20
 I. R. Macneil, “The Many Futures of Contracts”, (1974) 47 Southern California Law Review, 691, 693 
21
 I. R. Macneil, “Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Limberg & de Vos.”, (1987) 143 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 272, 274 
22
  I. R. Macneil, “The Many Futures”, 694 
23
 I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract, (New Haven, Conn. USA: Yale UP, 1980) 
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5) obligations 
6) transferability 
7) attitudes 
8) power, hierarchy and command.  
According to another article of MacNeil24, the formulation of a more relational context 
would demand to base in certain core propositions. First, that every transaction is 
embedded in complex transactions; second understanding any transaction requires 
understanding all essential elements of its enveloping relations; third, effective analysis of 
any transaction requires recognition and consideration of all essential elements of its 
enveloping relations that might affect the transaction significantly; fourth, combined 
contextual analysis of relations and transactions is more efficient and produces a more 
complete and sure final analytical product than does commencing with non-contextual 
analysis of transactions. 
 
Contracts’ “Primal Roots” 
 
Third, MacNeil argues that contracts have four “primal roots”. The first one is 
‘specialization and exchange’, two ideas that are correlated. The second one is a “sense of 
choice”25, which means the freedom to select a behavior between a specific behavioral 
range, the third is the ‘conscious awareness of past, present and future’ 26 and the fourth 
is 'the social matrix’27, which means the overall social and linguistic background to 
which contracts and promises can be attached   
 
Relational Adjustments, Negotiation and Conflicts’ Resolution 
 
                                                
24
 I. R. Macneil, “Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries”, (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law 
Review, 877, 881 
25
 I. R. Macneil, “The Many Futures”, 701 
26I. R. Macneil, “The Many Futures”, 706-710 
27
 ibid, 710ff 
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Fourth, Macneil identifies the importance of adjustments and continuous negotiation in 
the relational contracts. Although the written parts of the relations may play a 
constitutional role for them, their importance depends on their compatibility with current 
relational circumstances and if they become dysfunctional for the ongoing of the relation 
they should not influence it much28. He underlines the role of certain hierarchies that 
exist in relational contracts and that show the variable importance of certain aspects of 
the relations for each single party. The longer the relation is the more complex it becomes 
and the conventional model of adjustments may not result to adequate solutions29. 
McNeil uses dispute resolution as an example of contrast between conventional and 
relational contract30, emphasising it much as a valuable tool that can function well in the 
governance of relational contracts.  
 
Agents & Principals 
 
Fifth, another key point of McNeil’s work is the element of involving agents rather than 
principals in a contractual relation31. In modern –mostly commercial- contracts law, most 
contracts are rather made by  agents as the principles are mainly firms Macneil 
emphasizes this element as contract becomes much more complex and ‘relational’ where 
those engaging in contracting activity are acting on behalf of legal entities, such as 
corporations.  
 
McNeil’s Contractual Norms 
 
The concept of Norms 
 
Sixth, the core of MacNeil’s thoughts concerns a number of “norms in a positivist sense”, 
which govern contracts and may replace rational self-interest as the governing norm of 
                                                
28
 I. R. Macneil, “Contracts:Adjustment”, 854-857, 894 
29
 ibid, 900 
30
  ibid, 891 
31
 I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract, 78-84; P. S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract, (New York USA:OUP, 1986), 352 
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contracts32. By that term, Macneil tries to describe a number of norms that can be 
observed in the practice and operation of contracts, thus constituting norms in fact. This 
kind of norms has to be distinguished from normative norms, which are suggested by 
positive economics theories. Two very important matters are related to these norms. The 
first one has to do with actual legal doctrine’s compliance with these norms, as this 
compliance is crucial for the law’s ability to successfully regulate contractual relations. 
The second has to do with extent to which a specific exchange relation abides by these 
norms, as this issue is related to the extent to which the relation will meet longevity, the 
parties will earn more benefits from it and the overall relational spectrum will succeed. In 
“New Social Contract”, he describes a norm as a ‘pattern or trait taken to be typical in the 
behavior of a social group’33 and whose role is to determine “the behaviour that does 
occur in relations, must occur if relations are to continue, and hence ought to occur so 
long as their continuance is valued.”34. 
 
The List of Common and Relational Norms 
 
In “Many Futures”, Macneil also suggests for the first time five contract norms. He 
believed that the acceptance of these norms could be the cornerstone for the 
establishment of a single general theory of contracts, which could apply to all sorts of 
contracts and lead to a unified law of contract. These are:  
1) reciprocity 
2) role effectuation 
3) limited freedom of exercise of choice 
4) effectuation of planning and  
5) harmonizing with the social matrix.35 
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In “The New Social Contract”36, MacNeil increases these norms to thirteen and 
distinguishes them into two categories. The first set of nine norms37 concerns all the 
contracts, while another set of four norms are intensified in relational contracts. In other 
articles he changes the name of some norms and adds one more, propriety of means38 to 
the first set, which he also adds –in later works- to the initial four relational 
norms.Finally, the first set of ten norms consists of:  
1. role integrity  
2. reciprocity (or ‘mutuality’) 
3. implementation of planning 
4. effectuation of consent 
5. flexibility 
6. contractual solidarity 
7. the ‘linking norms’ (restitution, reliance and expectation interests) 
8. the power norm (creation and restraint of power) 
9. propriety of means 
10. harmonization with the social matrix39. 
 
The second set of the five “relational” norms consists of two norms that are same as 
above (common norms) and three more:  
1. role integrity 
2. preservation of the relation 
3. harmonization of relational conflict 
4. supracontract norms 
5. propriety of means40 
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On the other hand he suggests one more norm that fits more into conventional-
transactional contracts, the norm that enhances discreteness and presentiation41. 
Therefore, while he sets-up a model of norms for all contracts he distinguishes between 
contracts with a more conventional or relational character, pointing out that there are 
some other special norms for them or that some of the common norms are more 
important in relational contracts. A key isue about MacNeil’s arguments about these sets 
of norms has to do with the idea that the specific role, content and significance of every 
norm depends on the extent to which relational or discreet elements prevail in the specific 
relation.  
 
The Common Norms 
 
Concerning the ‘role integrity norm’42, we should note that it is an idea already apparent 
in Macauley’s work, who assumes that the parties of a contractual relation “seek to 
overcome formal rationality to achieve goals”43. The parties will be rather based on 
certain anticipation standards about what their counterparties are going to do and how 
they are going to fulfil their obligations, according to the idea that they perceive about 
them44. Especially in more relational contracts, parties tend to overcome the formal rules 
in order to serve their goals by a more functional and efficient way. However, in order to 
achieve it, they have to trust the other party and expect that it is going to behave properly 
and fulfil their respective obligations in an adequate –depended on the image that they 
have about them- way45. Thus, expectations about the other party’s behaviour are a 
fundamental for the establishment, development and continuation of every relation and 
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especially of a long-term and complex one46. In general, role integrity describes complex, 
long-term behaviours that involve diverse obligations and more personal relations47. 
The norm of ‘reciprocity’ is a very important norm of social relations in general and has 
to do with the reasonable anticipation of every party that their counter-party is going to 
give them something back in correspondence to their own contribution to the relation48. 
In other words, every party assumes that it will earn a benefit because of its own 
behaviour in the relation and specifically that the other party will respond to it. This kind 
of expectation is fundamental for building trust and succeeding longevity especially in 
long-term contracts, however is also essential for every kind of contract and exchange 
relation in general. This social exchange of obligations leads the parties to undertake 
future obligations of content not necessarily clarified in advance. Actually in every aspect 
of exchanges and contracts, there exists the “quid pro quo” rule, according to which 
every party’s provision is matched by the other party’s counter-provision. Although 
reciprocity norm may not be as apparent as it is in discrete exchanges, because of the 
complex and multileveled character of the parties respective provisions (for example a 
party may prefer to receive a later benefit by its partner because of the nature of the 
relation), it is evenly important in relational exchanges as it forms the basis for trust, self-
commitment and (especially long-term) cooperation.  
McNeil initially referred to this norm as “mutuality”, something very important as 
mutuality should characterise every aspect of a continuous relational exchange and 
benefits and risks should be allocated in a way that permits every party to anticipate that 
the counterparty will reciprocate its own overall behaviour. In relational contracts, 
reciprocity does not only concern quantified and measurable provisions but refers to the 
overall behaviour anticipated from one party concerning the other. According to McNeil 
reciprocity “calls not for equality  but for some kind of evenness”49, meaning that under 
relational circumstances (far more complex than the give and take strategy in discreet 
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exchanges), reciprocity should not be defined as a norm that necessarily calls for an exact 
balance concerning the parties’ contributions to the relation (given the fact that such a 
balance is difficult to be achieved because of the non-quantified character of many aspects 
of the relation) but should better be perceived as the need for securing that every 
counterparty will take from the other something adequate in compensation for their 
behaviour. What is the character and content of this “adequate compensation” depends 
on the nature of the relation, the behaviour of every party towards the other and the 
position of the parties within this relation. Reciprocity is also related to fairness in 
contracting50 and bargaining51.  
‘Effectuation of consent’ is another norm, according to which in every exchange the 
exercise of a choice involves the sacrifice of other opportunities, as a party’s behaviour 
constitutes a consent that allows the other to limit the freedom of the first one. This norm 
is related to the primal root of “sense of choice”52. The foundation and the reason of such 
a limitation are based on the consent of the first party and according to the degree of this 
consent the above limitation obtains its special content. In relational contracts, this 
effectuation is distinctive as this limitation that refers to future actions is not determined 
in advance but depends on a number of factors referring to the ongoing relation. We 
could describe the core of that norm as a rule according to which, the parties’ obligations 
in a relation are determined by their initial and ongoing consent, by commitments 
undertaken at the beginning of the relation or subsequently and by facts that they knew 
since the beginning of the relation  or are necessary results of the relation53. Effectuation 
of consent along with implementation of planning are two norms that combined together 
form the normative framework of discreet transactions (enhancing discreteness and 
presentiation), as any activity and behaviour related to the exchange concerns the 
effectuation of a formal agreement. 
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‘Implementation of planning’ is related to the parties’ action to determine commitments 
that are going to be fulfilled in future, by a present agreement and planning. MacNeil 
emphasises the element of planning in his overall work, as he assumes that the relational 
contracts theory is useful for contract planning. Planning refers to the content of the 
contract and to the processes followed in the relation. This norm is also liked with the 
axis –mentioned above- about ‘Obligations undertaken’, which constitutes the content of 
the contract. Therefore, this norm is significant in discreet transactions, but it has a 
different character according to the relational element of each exchange. The source of 
content in transactions is expressively communicated, the specifity of content and 
obligations is high and the sources of obligations are external. Mutual and individual 
planning is done at the beginning of the transaction, is concerned about the dispute-
resolution definition, the subject of the exchange is totally defined and the basic 
parameters of the contract are mostly quantifiable and thus pre-defined as completely as 
possible. On the other hand, in relational contracts the content is partially determined by 
the relation itself, the specificity is low and the sources of obligations are both external 
and internal, as they refer to the relation itself. There is more focus on process planning 
and on the performance of the relation, some part of the planning is left for the future, 
planning has a much more mutual character and involves less conflict and more mutual 
allocation of risks and benefits. In most of the relations planning involves both 
transactional and relational characteristics, as some objects of planning need to be defined 
with specificity, although there is always “an element of tentativeness”, which limits 
specificity to a certain degree54, while standardised planning may break down55.  
Flexibility as a norm may be assumed as a counter to “implementation of planning”56, as 
the first focuses on the parties’ ability to reconstruct the content of their relation, while 
the second focuses on how they can pre-define it. Flexibility is related to uncertainties 
always existing in every exchange and get more important in long-term relations and 
exchanges with a far more relational scope and to the necessary adjustments made in 
order to achieve it. In discreet transactions, every future adjustments aiming at achieving 
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flexibility are planned outside the actual exchange57, as flexibility is achieved by entering 
or refraining from entering a contract; while in relational exchanges the flexibility is 
achieved inside the relation and is determined by the parties’ actions, planning and 
behaviour within the relation. Thus we understand that flexibility and implementation of 
planning are two norms not so far from each other; however flexibility has a much 
different and broader scope, referring to every other norm. Flexibility is a prerequisite for 
the relation’s solidarity, a means for every party to continue to play its role in the relation 
and a means for parties in order to resolve their relational conflicts that may be caused by 
unpredictable events; a need also requested by the overall social matrix of the relation; an 
element related to the consent and creation of power as the parties tend to change their 
priorities within the relation, thus asking for a change of the content of their or their 
counterparty’s commitments because of an alteration of parameters of the ongoing 
relation; the parties also anticipate that their counterparties are going to work 
continuously on achieving flexibility and they also assume as fair and proper to be able to 
alter the content of the relation according to uncertainties, because otherwise they could 
result bound to prior commitments that are not related to the present situation, 
something that could also result to exploitative and unfair consequences. Thence, 
although flexibility is a characteristic norm of MacNeil’s relational theory, we could 
suggest that it is not actually a norm but a prerequisite for the effectuation of all other 
norms58.   
Macneil defines solidarity as "no more than the norm of holding exchanges together"59 
and means that parties usually tend to select behaviours that facilitate the relations’ 
stability and allow the relation to continue. According to Macneil, contractual solidarity 
has a great importance for every contract as it constitutes the expansion –in contracts- of 
the general idea that within a society, everyone is interdependent and every party’s 
behaviour has to operate according to a set of rules, which are accepted by the large 
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majority, while it is very important for long-term relations as business partnerships, 
alliances and cooperation. This interdependence is presented in contracts by the fact that 
even the parties’ selfish interest may lead them to the choice of preserving the contract. 
Actually, the parties understand that cooperation is the only way in which every party’s 
individual interest may result to the benefit of the other as well, as actions that decrease 
the other party’s interest endanger the relation, thus threatening the first party’s long-
term interest as well60. Although Campbell argues that ‘this co-operative attitude makes 
the notion of the individual utility maximiser inappropriate to relational contracts’61, it is 
understandable that both parties continue to serve their own interests by cooperation in a 
way so profitable that encourages them to give priority to long-term benefit, for the sake 
of which they prefer to sacrifice a short-term benefit that derives from mere opportunistic 
behaviours. According to this opinion, people cooperate, not due to altruism, but in order 
to increase their own utility62 and a cornerstone of contractual solidarity and cooperation 
lies in the parties’ self-interest63 as their individual long-term interest conflicts with short-
term interest64.  
Macneil underlines that contractual solidarity is a norm of contract law, as law enhances 
the contractual stability in two ways. Firstly, it enhances our anticipation that our 
counter-parties will fulfil their obligations, not because we actually intend to use the 
solution of litigation but only because law offers us such an opportunity. Thus, legal 
mechanisms play a pre-emptive role against any breach and in that way it facilitates trust 
and cooperation65.  
The ‘linking norms’ are restitution, reliance, and expectation interests. Although, 
according to other authors, such as Austen-Baker, are not assumed as actual norms, 
MacNeil assumes that they are necessary for adjustments of the relation after the initial 
agreement. Restitution is important when one party earns an unfair benefit against the 
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interests of the other, reliance is important in order to add actual bindingness to non 
legally binding agreements and promises and expectation actually constitutes the party’s 
perception about what the counterparty has promised. Hence, these principles are 
essential –according to McNeil- in order to determine the content of every adjustment of 
the relation that is undertaken as a response to unforeseen circumstances. 
The ‘power norm’ has to do with the creation of power of a party on another and the 
restraint of its own powers for the benefit of the other, a phenomenon that occurs in every 
contractual relation66 and has a main importance under more “relational” circumstances, 
because of the duration of the relation and the parties’ interdependence. The reason for 
that creation and restraint of power is that a contractual relation and the overall 
cooperative context imposes on us certain obligations that limit our behaviour and our 
freedom of acting and give to the counterparty rights of intervention in a field of our 
interest, while respectively we receive corresponding rights on it67.  
‘Propriety of means’ is a norm that according to some authors fits in both the ten common 
and the specific relational norms68. According to MacNeil it is “… the ways relations are 
carried on as distinct from more substantive matters, including not merely formal and 
informal procedures, but such things as customary behaviour, often of the most subtle 
kind”69. It means that when we get into a relation with another party, we have to choose 
certain behavioural patterns that seem appropriate, given the whole social context and 
the specific nature of every relation. By the relation, the parties certainly pursue some 
individual goals; however they are not free to accomplish them by any mean –no matter 
the cost for the counterparty- and without keeping any standard of substantial fairness. 
This norm has also a specific relational dimension, as the specific propriety and 
acceptability of means depends on the nature of each specific relation and the special 
parameters concerning the scope of the relation, the parties’ profile and their individual 
and collective needs and goals. So, the notion of propriety has to be adapted to the 
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specific parameters of each relation and apart from some common standards, we can 
describe a complete model of proper means fitting into any relation. 
‘Harmonisation with the social matrix’ is related to the relevant primal root of contracts –
mentioned above- and means that the relation has to comply with the overall set of 
factors that define exchanges in a given society, including legal enforcing mechanisms, 
communication protocols, trade, metric, transporting and monetary systems and 
procedures of trading and bargaining and that every exchange is developed to the extent 
to and in the way in which the social matrix permits this to happen. According to McNeil 
the social matrix consists of everything necessary for an exchange to occur70 and the 
relation is integrated in it, thus being influenced and taking elements by it. This norm 
equally applies to all kinds of contracts no matter how discreet or relational they are; as 
they unavoidably incorporate elements referring to some commonly accepted standards.  
 
The Relational Norms 
 
According to MacNeil “preservation of the relation” is just an intensification and 
expansion of the norm of contractual solidarity"71 and includes both individual 
(preservation of members of the relation) and collective (preservation of the whole 
relation) preservation. According to other points of view, this norm constitutes an 
expansion on the field of relational contracts of the common norms of contractual 
solidarity and flexibility. According to a third point of view72, this relational norm is 
based on the two common norms above, however reciprocity, creation and restraint of 
power and the linking norms also are minor contributors to it. 
‘Harmonisation of relational conflict’ is a norm also related to the preservation of the 
relation73. However the reason why MacNeil treats it as a distinct norm lies in the fact that 
in modern contractual relations, it is possible that there exist conflicts between the 
internal and external relations within the relationship and measured and non-measured 
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aspects of the relation. The importance of the harmonisation of such conflicts is so 
important for the survival of the relationship and for the parties’ behaviour that must be 
treated separately74. According to another point of view75, this norm is related to the need 
for flexibility and to the norm harmonization with the social matrix, a point of view with 
which we do not agree, as we believe that this common norm has a much broader 
meaning and influences much more parametres of the overall social context than the 
relational conflicts and that the harmonisation of the relational conflict is mostly related 
to the overall solidarity and preservation of the relation. This norm is highly related to the 
establishment of a framework that helps dispute resolution and constant adjustments of 
the exchange relationship76. 
Supracontract norms constitute factors of the relation that derive from contractual 
relations and frameworks of a larger scale that may form ‘minisocieties and ministates’77, 
under cicrumstances when the exchange occurs within a behavioral framework largely 
accepted and they do not have a particular contractual nature. 
Supracontract norms are those factors in relations that are not particularly contractual in 
nature78, for example factors arising from large contractual relations forming or broad 
norms such as distributive and procedural justice, liberty, human dignity and social 
equality and inequality79. This norm is related to the harmonisation with the social 
matrix80. 
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Other Litterature about Relational Contracts Theory 
 
Acceptance and Application of McNeil’s Theory   
 
Based on the theoretical approaches of MacNeil’s work, other authors established 
interesting arguments about the relational element that is apparent in contracts and 
especially in contracts based on the interdependence and cooperation of the parties 
mainly in business transactions.  
Bird81 applies relational contract theory to employment contracts and he defines 
employment as a relational contract forged by the parties’ behaviour. He also emphasizes 
the importance of norms in such contracts, mentioning that almost every aspect of the 
employment relation that falls outside the explicit content of employment contracts and 
the statutes, such as corporate culture, office politics, trust, future planning, and the 
complex social matrix of organizational life are the exclusive domains of norms.  
Austen-Baker82 discusses the issue of the application of McNeil’s theory about contract 
norms to consumer law, in order to examine certain presuppositions of consumer law. He 
examines a) the consumer-supplier relation b) consumers as the vulnerable and 
disadvantaged party in a consumer-supplier relation c) regulation (intervention of the 
state) as essential for consumers’ protection. The above statements are rejected by the 
author, after testing them by using the contractual norms of solidarity, reciprocity, role 
integrity and propriety of means and “the agents without principles” theory. Therefore, 
the author proves the norms-based approach practical value as a means, in order to 
analyze and understand the content, orientation, and the factors defining a certain 
relation.  
Lisa Bernstein’s work83 is also related to McNeil’s theories, especially as far as norms and 
business relations are concerned, as she studies industries that have opted out of the 
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public legal system and have replaced it with privately drafted commercial codes and 
arbitration tribunals to resolve disputes and how contractual relations in certain 
industries result to the rules, norms and institutions that constitute the industry's private 
legal system and manage to create value for transactors. Her work examines the legal and 
extralegal aspects of contracting relationships, which generate conditions that are 
conducive to the creation, maintenance and restoration of cooperative contracting 
relationships. Bernstein also underlines that the social and informational infrastructures 
of trade form reputation-based non-legal sanctions, which play an important role in the 
structure of some industries and whose availability allows transactors to create value-
enhancing contract governance structures that are unavailable if the transactions were 
governed by the public legal system. Bernstein applies the theoretical approaches of 
relational contracts in the reality of modern business structures and underlines the value 
of certain basic norms in the regulation of relationships even by private regulation 
systems, proving their applicability and catholicity.  
David Campbell84 also tries to use relational theory to justify efficient breach of contract, 
and to rationalize the rules limiting both specific performance and compensatory 
damages. Furthermore, McNeil’s literature -especially as far as norms are concerned- has 
been examined in relevance to the extent to which they are supported by English case law 
or statutes. Austen-Baker85 argues that role integrity, effectuation of consent, creation and 
restraint of power, linking norms, propriety of means and harmonization with the social 
matrix are strongly supported, while he mentions that the discrete norm is obviously 
fully supported. Reciprocity is also supported but in a less obvious and strong way, while 
flexibility is supported by the fact that implementation of planning is an obvious part of 
contract law and that the conventional doctrines of waiver and promissory estoppel 
provide for the variation of contract terms by mutual consent86.  
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On the other hand, other scholars rejected McNeil’s theories. Specifically, Posner, 
although he recognized that there are certain problems and opportunities for the parties 
when they have a continuing relationship, he believes that economics literature is much 
more capable of handling such problems87. 
Despite of the above, relational contract theory received a wider acceptance in 
management scholarship, while McNeil’s work was assumed as difficult to understand 
and apply in legal scholarship.  
 
Other Arguments and Approaches towards Relational Contracts 
 
Definition of Relational Contracting 
 
Regarding the definition of relational contracts, we should note that although several 
have to date been offered88, none appears to be universally accepted. McNeil highlights 
the importance of two principles of behaviour: solidarity and reciprocity89.Goetz and 
Scott90, talk about the tendency to equate the term "relational contract" with long-term 
contractual relationships and state that this is due to the fact that a contract is relational 
"to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the 
arrangement to well-defined obligations". They91 argue that what makes a contract 
relational is that there are some contracts where obligations cannot be ex ante defined. 
Whereas the literature on long-term contracts focuses on the problems which arise 
because of incompleteness and the potential for renegotiation, the theory of relational 
contracts focuses on the relationship between the contracting parties which ensures that 
opportunistic behaviour does not arise and the way in which cooperation can be secured. 
Mitchell92 distinguishes between two different and often incompatible ‘worlds’ within 
which contractual relationships can be developed, a distinction deriving from sociolegal 
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scholarship, which is based on the assumption that legal reasoning might be improved by 
more attention to the real world of contracting at the expense of the artificial world of 
documents and classical doctrine.  
 
Reputation & Long-Term Relations 
 
Hviid93 recognizes a strong relation between long term cooperation and relational 
contracts94. Contracts should be examined as a combination of legally enforceable and 
self-enforceable obligations, as some obligations need to be self-enforceable because third 
parties cannot verify the facts giving rise to a particular obligation and others need to be 
self-enforceable because of the transaction costs of using the legal system. He underlines 
the effects of renegotiation on the relation95 and insists on the importance of the reliance 
of the parties to each other’s good faith and of the proper allocation of risks and liability, 
in order to resolve unforeseen problems concerning the relationship.  
According to Baird96, if having the reputation of either keeping to a contract term, or 
modifying or bargaining to fill a gap in good faith, the law is not needed to enforce this 
term. In a relational contract, the parties rely on each other to behave in a cooperative 
manner for the duration of the contract, rather than exploiting any opportunity which 
may appear.  
 
Contract Enforcement and Remedies in Relational Contracts 
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Klein97 argues that court enforcement and private enforcement need not be alternative 
contract enforcement mechanisms, but may be complements. The former may on its own 
generate too much rigidity, making it possible for one party to ‘hold-up’ the other when 
conditions change radically while the latter generates too much flexibility.  
Jennejohn98, although accepts that contextualist contract enforcement retains its 
importance in non-collaborative contract schemes, he also proposes a hybrid approach 
that should integrate both formalism and problem-solving judicial intervention and that 
could constitute an adequate basis for explaining how modern firms define their 
relationships. 
Scott99, examines the role of courts and state in the regulation of relational contracts 
especially as in relational contracts, parties have incentives to breach by exploiting gaps 
in the contract, although enforcing the verifiable terms and trying to fill in the gaps by 
interpretation gives a partial solution. According to the author, the application of the 
common law plain meaning and parol evidence rules can preserve the value of 
predictable interpretation and common law formalism plays an important role in 
expanding the variety of standard form terms100, which could reduce contracting costs the 
parties and this formalist approach not only supports the effective interpretation of 
contract language but it also generates standardized and adequately tailored clauses101. 
Another interesting approach102 points out that MacNeil’s work focused only on the 
limitations of formal remedies within the framework of the relational theory of Contract 
and that relational contracts theory has focused on extra-legal or informal devices for the 
regulation of long-term contractual relations and the frequent use of Alternative Dispute 
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Resolution mechanisms (as Bernstein argued). It examines how the remedial response to 
the breach of a long-term relational contract should differ from the ordinary or traditional 
legal response to contract breach. The European Draft Common Frame of Reference 
includes certain remedial provisions that could fit for relational contracts’ specificities 
and that it could constitute the basis for a relational contracts’ remedies law. 
 
Suggestions for a Simpler Contractual Norms’ Theory 
 
MacNeil’s theory about norms may be criticised as too complex and difficult to 
understand, explain and use, a fact that constitutes an obstacle for its practical 
implementation. Austen-Baker, based on MacNeil’s norms, sets-up a four-norm model, 
which names as “comprehensive contracts theory”, by merging some of MacNeil’s norms 
and substituting them by four universal contract norms that apply both to relational and 
common contracts103.  
The first one is the norm of preservation of the relation, which includes contractual 
solidarity, preservation of the relation and harmonisation of relational conflict; the second 
one is the harmonisation of the social matrix, which comprehends harmonisation with the 
social matrix, and supracontract norms; the third one is the norm of satisfying 
performance expectation, which integrates implementation of planning and 
presentiation, effectuation of consent to presentiation, role integrity and the creation and 
restraint of power; and the fourth one is the substantial fairness, which includes propriety 
of means, reciprocity and creation and restraint of power (also included in the previous 
norm). Flexibility is considered as “an essential component in all the norms”, the linking 
norms are not assumed as norms by the author, as they constitute interests that are not 
very relevant to the contract104, and discreteness, although it is involved in every contract, 
cannot be assumed as a norm, as it cannot be assumed as universal105. On the other hand, 
the author accepts that presentiation alone could be a part of satisfying performance 
expectations norm.  
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CHAPTER B: THE RELATIONAL CHARACTER OF 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 
 
General Content of Management Contracts 
 
Historic Evolution of Management Contracts 
 
A management contract is an agreement under which a company assigns its own 
management to another company, which offers such services in return for a fee. 
According to Cunill106, Schluter and Martinek, the method of management 
contracts was developed firstly in British Empire in the late 19th in the form of “managing 
agencies”107, as in colonies in south-eastern Asia there was a lack in experienced staff and 
management agencies were specialised in undertaking management industrial 
enterprises in these overseas territories, on behalf of domestic British enterprises. At the 
beginning of 20th century, management agreements were widely spread in USA, mainly 
in the energy sector, as a form of know-how transfer while later management agreements 
transformed from a means of cooperation into a means of administration, as the small 
companies entering these administrative schemes (konzern) were loosing their structural 
independence. Management agreements continued being used as a means of cooperative 
development between companies in other fields, such as rail industry, insurances, 
machinery construction industry, mining and ores processing industry, publishing 
companies, hotel companies108, etc, while they grew much after WWII as a means of 
know-how transfer from developed countries to developing world enterprises 
(international management agreements) and as an alternative to the gradual privatisation 
of state owned enterprises and public utilities109.  
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Object of Management Contracts 
 
The object of management contracts (or management agreements, as they are 
referred elsewhere) is the transfer of the management of an enterprise or corporation or 
business unit or facility from the owner institution (called recipient) to another external 
institution, usually referred as Management Company (or provider), which is usually 
paid for the management services that it offers.  
Attempting to define the meaning of management, we could use one of the 
following definitions: “A system of actions for achieving the objectives of a social group 
by effectively exploiting specific resources” or “The set of processes and checks by which 
maintenance of organisational structure and the objectives of a group of people towards a 
specific result are ensured”. According to Wheelen and Hunger110, management leads the 
people of a company, meaning it is responsible to select, motivate, lead, instruct, control 
and coordinate the executives and employees of a company, in the framework of its 
organisational structure, aiming at the achievement of its objectives and at a productive 
and effective operation.  
Management contracts belong to the family of outsourcing contracts111 
(management is viewed as a separate corporate function that can be outsourced) and the 
largest family of business partnership schemes, incorporating the element of business 
services’ provision.  They are a type of new business governance structures (such as 
business networks, joint ventures, co-production agreements) in which a part or the 
whole of activities management of the collaborating parties is performed according to a 
common objective achievement, which is the focal point of the cooperation and in order 
to be achieved central coordination is required that is fulfilled via collective management 
or management by a central body of all activities.  
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Management Contracts as Reciprocal Contracts 
 
A “management agreement”112, is usually concluded between a company in the 
form of legal private or public body and a company of the same or similar business 
activity with international reputation. Focusing on the legal part of this agreement, the 
company receiving management services assigns the company of international reputation 
the business management on their behalf. At the same time, the management company 
undertakes the obligation to manage the assigning company either completely, or for 
specific sectors, under the name, on behalf and at risk of the company receiving 
management services and for an agreed period of time. Therefore, according to a typical 
management agreement, the management company performs any material and legal 
actions concerning the fulfilment of business purpose, like day to day management and 
company representation to third parties.  
The breadth of management company’s responsibilities is specified in the agreement 
concerned, depending on its context. Some of them are, for example: personnel 
recommendation for management positions of the company; personnel management 
(both those recommended and those already employed in the client-company); 
economical, financial, accounting management and support; management of production 
and other departments; conclusion of contracts that are common and necessary for 
normal everyday operation of the company; arranging the installation, expansion and 
monitoring of IT systems and more.  
Management contracts can be categorised according to several factors. The 
management company may manage a company either wholly or only several sectors113, 
like production or marketing department. Depending on the type and level of 
responsibilities assigned to the management provider, according to the management 
agreement content114 that expresses the will of the parties, management agreements are 
separated into limited or extended agreements. According to the place where the 
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managerial services are delivered, meaning whether both the provider and the recipient 
operate in the same country or not, management contracts are distinguished between 
national and international respectively115. 
Since the management company runs the management receiving company under 
the name and on behalf of the latter, it means that the only beneficiary of profits, 
damages, rights and liabilities, emanating from the manager’s administrative-managerial 
activity, is the company receiving management services. However, the manager is 
entitled to management costs and of course payment.  The assigning company also takes 
the risk for the success or failure of management. In case, however, it is specifically stated 
that the manager’s payment will be determined according to management results, the 
manager will also be indirectly and partly responsible for any business risks. The 
explanation that the company receiving management services is mainly the one 
responsible of any risks lies in the fact that any business activity is materialised with their 
own resources and concerns tangible and intangible assets of the company. Even when 
the management company grants personnel to the client-company, since there is a 
payment for it, such human resources are thought to be coming from the assigning 
corporation and, therefore, the risk still belongs to it. However, when it comes to know-
how, management and sometimes, mainly in cases of false management, to goodwill or to 
certain industrial rights or copyrights, then such resources definitely come from the 
manager. 
 
Benefits of Management Contracts for the Parties 
 
Benefits of a management agreement belong to two categories, unilateral and 
bilateral benefits116. The recipient profits by the reputation and credit worthiness of the 
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provider, obtains know-how117, becomes more efficient and increases its credit rating and 
ability of attracting investments and loans. Furthermore, the recipient achieves a severe 
cost reduction concerning management, production and distribution costs, due to the 
cooperation with the provider. The providers benefit not only from the management 
fees118, but from the relation itself as well, as according to Martinek119 it functions as an 
indirect investment. They participate in the recipient’s earnings without involving capital 
and assuming extended risk and cost and while they expand their management skills, 
their knowledge and their brand name strength in new markets; thus, these contracts 
function as an alternative to direct foreign investment120. However, modern management 
agreements are based on a more even allocation of risk, as providers are also obliged to 
contribute to initial working capital and their stable fees are being replaced  by based on 
performance incentive fees. Both parties have the opportunity to increase their business 
reputation and goodwill and the efficiency of R&D processes, because of economies of 
scale. Concerning networking121, the main benefit of the recipient relates to its 
participation in networks of suppliers, customers, distribution, technological, research 
and scientific cooperation and generally any type of business cooperation. However, the 
provider through this process also develops and strengthens any cooperation networks 
that is a part of and sometimes even controls.  
 
The special characteristics of the Parties’ Relation within a Management Contract 
 
Management contracts constitute a legal tool of severe strategic importance for 
modern business, as they focus on the building of links between corporate entities, in 
order to succeed strategic objectives of mutual interest (low cost, enhancement of know-
how, growth with low risk etc). Given the object (corporate management), usual length, 
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objectives to be accomplished, effects on the parties and other elements of such contracts, 
it is obvious that a certain relation is developed between the contracted parties, a relation 
that is distinguished by certain key characteristics, defining its special nature. 
 
The complexity of the Contract’s Object 
 
Firstly, this relation is determined by the special role and function of corporate 
management. Management not only is the controlling and major activity of every 
corporation, always linked with its institutional self-existence, but it also constitutes a 
very complex activity related to every aspect of a corporation and affecting every matter 
of it. The relation between the parties involves issues concerning asset control, separation 
of control and ownership, roles in decision making, allocation of risk, link of provider’s 
fees and recipient’s results, careful planning, transfer of know-how and intangible assets, 
integration of provider’s staff in the recipient’s structure, allocation of responsibilities, 
obligations and liability. Thence, every management contract is characterised by a 
controversy: it can never be complete enough as the management’s object cannot be  fully 
determined in advance, while it must have a detailed content that should try to cover as 
much as possible aspects of the relation. Nevertheless, in every case, the object of transfer 
should be limited to a more or less extensive degree, as it cannot reach the full separation 
of the recipient from its own management. Furthermore, the actual value of the 
exchanges that the relation involves cannot be easily quantified and measured122. The 
measurement and evaluation of the provider’s performance is a very difficult task and it 
is usually approximately conducted; that is a matter directly affecting the need for 
detailed initial planning of the relation as it could evolve to a source of future conflict. 
 
Principals and Agents in a Management Contract’s Relation  
 
Second, such agreements take place only between corporate entities and not 
between individual entrepreneurs (the employment of a manager cannot be viewed as a 
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management contract123). So, this relation is based on agents’ interactions124, negotiations, 
understanding, cooperation, tolerance and approval. Their role for the relation is 
important especially in terms of the actual development and implementation of a 
functional and efficient organisational structure and of constant cooperation and reliance. 
 
Private and Exclusive Character of the Relation 
 
Third, above relation is strongly characterised by privacy and exclusivity. Both 
parties expect to the fulfilment of the contract by their counter-party itself and rarely 
tolerate or agree to a substitution. This feature is related to the special nature of 
management as a core business function and of each party’s incorporation in the 
corporate structure and networks of the other, which do not permit an easy transfer of 
rights and obligations to third parties. The whole relation is concentrated on the specific 
roles that the specific counter-party has to assume in order that the relation can function 
and its stability and preservation is based on how the parties will accomplish their 
expected roles. 
 
Interdependence between the Parties 
 
Fourth, the relation is always characterised by a great interdependence between 
the parties. Not only the recipient’s management is controlled by the recipient, thus the 
recipient becomes dependent of the provider’s decisions, but the provider’s interests 
become greatly attached to the recipient’s as well, not only because of the management 
fees, which are mainly determined by the recipient’s results, but also because of the 
recipient’s integration in the business networks of the provider. Such interdependence 
can also be observed in other outsourcing and inter-organisational structures125, however 
the special function of corporate management as the “brain and controlling hand” of 
entrepreneurship, gives a special significance to the interdependence under management 
contracts. 
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The Fiduciary Element in Parties’ Obligations 
 
The Merge of Structures and Management 
 
Therefore, a great link appears between the contracted parties, a link that is the 
result of the separation between ownership and management and concerns risk and 
profit as well. This link forms a triangular relation between the venture, the owner and 
the manager. Despite of the mostly one-sided allocation of risk in initial management 
agreements, the recent competition factors have imposed to the provider increased 
obligations of active and even financial participation in the recipient’s ventures.  
In management agreements, the legal link is spread over the whole corporate 
activity, as the object of the contract is not a mere business activity, but the controlling 
activity of all other business functions. So, this link is established on the centre of 
corporate existence of the parties, in a way that results to a partial merge of management. 
Parties not only devote assets, tangibles and intangibles, but they also accept a common 
administrative structure and decision centre (controlled by the provider), in order to 
succeed common objectives, in a way that resembles joint venture’s results. However, the 
special feature of management contracts is that this merge is not succeeded by the use of 
methods of corporate but of contracts law, therefore it products similar results, however 
with much less time, cost, risk and permanence and in a much more flexible way. 
 
The nature of Fiduciary Duties between the Parties 
 
As a result of all the above, another key element of management contracts arises 
and it has to do with their fiduciary content. As both parties tend to share common 
structure and common goals and the provider assumes the role of manager of the 
recipient, the whole relation is characterised by the fiduciary element to a great extent 
and both parties’ obligations towards each other –however mostly the provider’s 
obligations towards the recipient- are related to fiduciary duties. Trust, loyalty to other 
party’s interests, reliance, acting in good faith and confidentiality are essential elements 
 43
of the relation and the fiduciary duties constitute a determining factor of the relation’s 
content. The duty of extended care that characterises fiduciary relations constitutes the 
orientating factor of the anticipated behaviour in every aspect of the relation, from both 
parties and mainly affects the overall expected conduct of them, which can be specified in 
many particular aspects and obligations.  
This fiduciary element varies according to the dependence of the other party, the 
duration and the significance of the specific relation. Especially the provider’s role 
combines elements of a financial or managerial advisor and of the administrative body of 
the recipient. As the provider actually acts as a substitute body of the regular recipient’s 
administration, assumes identical rights and duties as well. Furthermore, the whole 
relation partially resembles partnership and the relationship between trustee and 
beneficiary.  
However, it would be rather right to attribute this fiduciary character to the 
specific nature of the relation and to the extent and kind of powers that are assigned 
mainly to the provider. According to Frame v. Smith126: "Relationships in which a fiduciary 
obligation have been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics: the fiduciary has scope 
for the exercise of some discretion or power; the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or 
discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and the beneficiary is 
peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power." All 
these three elements appear in management contracts, as we analyzed above. The mainly 
vulnerable party in the relation is the recipient for explicit reasons and as already 
identified, this vulnerability is related to its dependence on the provider and to the sui-
generis nature of management as a business function. Moreover, according to the same 
case-law “As well, it has frequently been noted that the categories of fiduciary relationship are 
never closed” and according to Ben-Israel v Valcare Medical127: “There are, however, other 
situations in which the duty arises, based on the particular situation and relationship of the 
parties”. 
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This fiduciary duty can be generally determined as a duty to adopt the objectives 
of the principal and this duty distinguishes such fiduciary relations from common 
relations, in which service providers act on behalf of others128. In management contracts, 
as described above, not only the parties adopt each other’s objectives, but their own 
individual benefit depends on the benefit of the other. Therefore, the whole spectrum of 
its obligations is determined by a strong fiduciary element. This element and the duties of 
loyalty and care define explicit obligations and produce implied terms as well, terms that 
could be described as fiduciary duties129. 
For reasons of certainty, parties tend to describe and include such obligations of 
fiduciary character in the contract; however such an attitude is not always followed, 
while some other obligations are rarely included. For example, although a non-
competition and confidentiality clause is a usual part of such a contract, its specific details 
usually remain unclear, while the obligation of acting with loyalty to the recipient’s long-
term interests, while usually mentioned in the preface of such agreements, can only be 
specified by its own nature, in practice and the obligation of respect for the philosophy 
and the scope of the recipient’s enterprise is almost never included. Therefore, the 
fiduciary character of the relation produces a series of obligations mostly for the provider, 
which derive by mutual trust, confidence and loyalty and as these obligations are not 
always mentioned or explicitly determined, they tend to be implied, in order to enhance 
fairness in the relation. Implied terms in management contracts however, do not serve 
only reasons of fairness, but they can also play a role in enhancing efficiency and 
flexibility of the relation, mainly concerning the specific way in which the management is 
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going to be performed130. Therefore, informal agreements and the practice of both parties 
set-up an implied framework (based on cooperation and mutual information and 
consent) in which management is performed. 
 
Fiduciary Duties in relation to Mutuality, Parties’ Roles and Relational Planning 
 
Either the implied in fact terms refer to the fairness or to the efficiency of the 
relation, they actually abide by the planed role of each party in the relation, a role that is 
related to certain obligations and consists of a certain expected behaviour. Such 
expectations can be reasonable to the extent to which they are linked with the contract’s 
function, planning, mutual goals and implementation.  
By such contracts, both parties aim at common goals, and only if these common 
goals are accomplished (e.g. the maximisation of profits for the recipient) both parties can 
benefit from the relation. Therefore, we can deduct the other key element of management 
contracts, which is mutuality. Mutuality is spread over the whole range of the relation 
and concerns benefits, risk, costs and managerial effort. Mutuality has to be taken into 
consideration in every step of the relation, from the initial planning to the allocation of 
responsibilities and profit, while a various range of mutual obligations derives from it. Of 
course, opportunistic and exploitative behaviour cannot be excluded mainly by the 
provider and can result not only to the destruction of the relation but to the economic 
failure of the recipient as well. However, in modern management contracts such 
behaviour is less usual, because of the competition in the management services sector and 
the increasing bilateral and interdependent character of such relations, which make 
management contracts highly reputation-based.  
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This focus on reputation, observed in the stage of the selection of a management 
provider and in the stage of the relation’s continuation as well, is also related to the 
necessity for both parties to resolve their problems by proper means and avoid a 
behaviour that may temporarily benefit them, but is certain that in future it will be the 
cause of failure of the whole relation, the importance of which (failure) can only be 
estimated in the framework of the usually multi-levelled and complex total relation. From 
this fact, a series of obligations, concerning the specific obligations of both parties to each 
other arise. They are related to the fact that the object of the contract is of such a high 
importance, that both parties should be very cautious. Because of managerial activities’ 
sensitive character and of the parties’ interdependence, a relation of trust and reliance 
between the parties is developed. Cooperation131, trust, reliance, interdependence, 
mutuality, resolution of problems by consent, constitute the foundation of the 
relationship and the source for many specific obligations of the parties, written or implied 
and related to the fiduciary character of the relation. Improper and exploitative behaviour 
in matters such as information of the other party, decision making, human resources 
relations, consideration of its individual structure, philosophy and institutional and 
strategic goals, focus on mere one-sided short-term profits and efforts for the other 
party’s one-sided and permanent (even after the contract’s termination) dependency on 
the other, may result to a great negative impact on both parties. 
 
The Incomplete Character of Management Contracts 
 
Constant Negotiation and intended combination of Completeness and Incompleteness 
 
Thus, we reach another key feature of management agreements, which is their 
highly cooperative character. Active cooperation is a result of mutuality and a 
prerequisite for the contract’s success. Cooperation may be a difficult goal to be 
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permanently accomplished, because of the parties’ different views on certain issues132, of 
their concern about post-contract issues and the natural difficulty for the management 
teams of the parties to adapt to each other’s philosophy and methodology. However, 
cooperation is a fundamental as the parties’ structure is partially integrated, thus 
common organisational goals are established and they have a great importance for both 
parties’ individual profits, especially as such contracts are developed in the framework of 
win-win strategies.  
The nature of the link and the interdependence between the parties mean that the 
relation is of high importance for both parties. The termination of such a contract is not an 
easy process and may involve great risks and losses for both parties, while usually these 
agreements’ results are only observed after years of cooperation. The managerial 
restructuring that these agreements involve cannot be accomplished in short times and 
the usually very lengthy duration of these contracts is indicative. Therefore, the 
preservation of such agreements and the solidarity of the general framework of 
cooperation that they set up is a priority for the parties. However, as the relation involves 
complex issues of assets and control allocation, major disputes may arise, so the parties 
assume the efficient initial planning as an issue of great significance. So, the management 
contract has to rely on a strong initial contractual basis, in order to function well and its 
solidarity can only be the result of an active and permanent cooperation between the 
parties. Planning of the relation is even more significant than in other similar forms of 
inter-corporations commitment and it involves a detailed due diligence process. 
However, because of the agreements’ nature and of the objectives pursued, such 
agreements have also to be adaptable to the changes of environmental factors that define 
the business efficiency of the parties. So, these agreements by their own nature combine 
flexibility with a detailed contractual basis, and although the initial contract has to be 
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complete as much as possible, it has to leave space for future adjustments and changes, in 
order that the relation retains its efficiency133. 
This cautious combination of completeness and intended incompleteness is a 
feature determining the special nature of management contracts. Negotiation between the 
parties is constant and comes along with cooperation and mutual consent, while the 
parties mainly prefer to harmonise their conflicts and resolve their problems by informal 
methods and mainly by inter-organisational communication. For example, issues about 
the managerial strategy to be implemented are a subject of constant renegotiation 
between provider’s and recipient’s strategic management groups and cooperation is 
essential for the formation of a basis of mutual consent for the management of the 
recipient. 
 
Management Contracts as Frameworks for Future Obligations 
 
Another element of management contracts’ nature has to do with their function as 
frameworks of general commitment and future obligations rather than as totally complete 
regulators of every aspect of parties’ relation134. Management is indeed a very complex 
activity and it would be totally inefficient if the parties tried to regulate their relation by a 
single contract. Moreover, management contracts are frequently related to a various list 
of other contractual relations, ranging from licensing to BOT. Their ability to combine 
with other forms of cooperative relations is a distinct feature, as they can play the role of 
the general regulatory framework for the whole spectrum of inter-parties cooperation, 
but a platform for negotiation as well135. Hence, management contracts can actually play 
the role of umbrella contracts136, under which a whole range of different contractual 
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relations, all falling under the key relation that management contracts define, can emerge. 
On the other hand, we should admit that management contracts are very detailed and 
may not have the general and open content of regular umbrella contracts, which intend to 
set up the framework that will be completed by future agreements. Nevertheless, 
management agreements can constitute the fundamental platform on which future 
specialised contracts can be integrated, while given the nature of management as a 
corporate activity, they can never be complete enough and as indicated above their 
detailed character is not controversial to their function as framework agreements. 
 
The various factors affecting the Relation’s Content 
 
Another characteristic of management contracts is that their exact content is 
determined by many and various different features of the relation that the parties plan to 
set up by these contracts; so they differ a lot from each other. We present an indicative list 
of factors and variables, on which the exact content of management agreements depends, 
without meaning that they are the only: 
1. the industry to which the contract refers and in which the recipient exists137 
2. the extent (less or more limited) to which recipient’s management is 
assigned 
3. the nature of duties (more consulting, less decisive or totally decisive/ 
financial management, production management, total management) that 
are actually assigned to the provider138 
4. the territorial (national/international, in one or all the enterprises of the 
recipient) and qualitative (strategic management, functional management, 
total management) definition of assigned management   
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5. the nature of the relation between the provider and the recipient before the 
contract (subsidiary-parent companies, independent companies, 
companies belonging in the same network or partnership)  
6. the financial value of the contract (e.g. referring to a venture of 2m. $) and 
the size of the parties (recipient or the provider is bigger than each other, 
or they both are pf medium or great size etc) 139 
7. the special financial and managerial purposes at which the contract aims 
(domestic or international growth, stabilization, costs reduction, know-
how transfer etc)  
8. the more or less permanent character of the relation and its intended 
duration 140 
9. the isolated or belonging to a broader spectrum of inter-corporate 
cooperation, character of the contract (in a business network or a sub-
construction relation etc) 141 
10. the number of parties involved in the contract and the number of parties 
involved in the broader framework into which the contract is integrated 
(e.g. network) 142 
11. if the contract concerns just a pure managerial assignment or concerns 
other forms of obligations (licensing, co-production, know-how transfer) 
or is combined with other contracts  
12. in case of the above, if the feature of managerial assignment is the key and 
distinctive feature of the specific inter-parties relation or is subsidiary to 
another key feature, in order to facilitate goals of a different nature (e.g. 
the accomplishment of a large-scale project for a third client). 
Hence, we can safely conclude that management contracts are not determined by a 
single model and only a few common standard clauses can be included in them. They 
actually contain clauses usually included in other types of contracts (e.g. BOT, co-
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production, know-how transfer etc), elements of which are included in them. Actually, 
just their basic orientation is similar in all these contracts (mainly referring to cooperation, 
confidentiality, methods for the calculation of the provider’s payment etc and of course to 
the transfer of management), while the specific content is determined by relational 
variables. Moreover, only a part of their content remains stable, while it is gradually 
completed by parties’ behaviour, later special agreements, developing practice, inter-
organisational structure and philosophy and other factors. In this way, they demonstrate 
that they could not easily be categorised into a distinct group of contracts (or possibly it 
would be wrong to use such a methodology in order to examine at least contracts 
referring to corporate cooperation), but they should rather examined with a consideration 
of the specific relation into which they fit. Furthermore, management agreements are 
highly dependent on the constantly changing and evolving character of inter-parties 
relations and different environmental factors. Thus, their content can only be examined in 
the framework of the multiple, various and changing aspects of the specific total relation 
and could not be separated from it. 
It is obvious that management contracts and every issue concerning them cannot 
be examined as a contract concerning a mere transaction, as by its own nature, it is so 
open and highly relational that could be viewed as a paradigm for the implementation of 
relational contracts theory. Its relational character is also underlined by the fact that 
management contracts cannot be viewed as a totally homogeneous category of contracts 
with standard terms and clauses, as their specific content depends on a series of different 
factors concerning the exact nature of every specific relation, which they are created to 
govern.  
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ANALYSIS OF THE OBLIGATIONS FROM MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACTS UNDER A RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 
THEORY NORMS FRAMEWORK 
 
 
We examine a series of obligations of the parties of a management contract, unilateral or 
bilateral, concerning either the provider or the recipient or both. We do not include the 
provider’s obligation for management of the recipient, because of its complexity, of being 
divided to several other obligations, of its content’s diversification and of involving an 
application of corporate law and management science. 
We examine these obligations under the framework of the contractual norms, as depicted 
by MacNeil’s work143. We preferred to use this extended set of norms144, instead of other 
shorter versions (such as Austen-Baker’s four norms145) –valuable for the understanding 
of norms’ use and role-, in order to investigate the issue of norms’ application to 
management contracts more thoroughly. We do not claim that the matching of 
obligations and norms is exact or completely accurate or includes all norms involved (it is 
almost certain that the exact matching will continue to be a matter of debate), however 
we believe that this matching, generally speaking, is close to reality and can be justified in 
a rational way.  
We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral obligations, while we refer to the relevant 
Diagram (Appendix), which also includes a short summary for each obligation’s relation 
to certain norms. 
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CHAPTER C: UNILATERAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
The parties’ obligations under a management contract can be distinguished between 
unilateral and bilateral. Unilateral obligations are distinguished between recipient’s and 
provider’s obligations. Some of these may concern terms that are explicitly included in 
the contract and directly refer to the relation’s actual object and implementation –such as 
fees, know-how transfer etc-; others –which are more usually implied- concern the 
behaviour and practices that are expected by the parties, due to their role and the scope of 
the relation and are essential for the accomplishment of the first obligations and the 
promotion of cooperation and trust between the parties.  
 
Recipient’s Obligations 
 
The recipient is mainly obliged to fulfil all the prerequisites, in order to help the work and 
mission of the provider and facilitate the latter achieve the goals of the relation. 
Therefore, most of the recipient’s obligations are bilateral (also refer to the provider as 
well) and concern duties deriving from the mutual effort for the achievement of common 
goals and the interdependence between the parties. Nevertheless, there are two major 
obligations that concern only the recipient. The first one is the payment of the provider 
and constitutes the most important obligation of the recipient as it characterises the whole 
nature of management contracts, as contracts by which the management of a corporation 
is assigned to another corporation -in order that the latter will exercise it for the benefit of 
the recipient- in exchange for payment. The second concerns the major prerequisite for 
the provider to be legally and practically allowed to exercise the recipient’s management 
and this prerequisite can only be accomplished by the recipient.  
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Fee Payment 
 
We have already mentioned that the main obligation of the assigning company 
towards the management company is the fee payment, which is actually an allowance for 
the management services provision by the latter. This fee in management contracts is 
usually mentioned as "compensation"146. Payment, even though initially does not 
comprise a component of the agreement, it is not a conceptual element, as in certain cases 
such an assignment may be agreed free of charge, especially when interests of the 
management company are also served through the agreement. However, in most 
management agreements the fee payment is the counter-provision of the recipient that 
corresponds to the provider’s provision of management services and the obligation that 
matches the provider’s obligations, in order to form a reciprocal contract. When fee 
payment is not a contract’s term, then the provider earns different benefits from the 
relation (e.g. collects information about a new market) as a compensation for its services. 
Moreover, these fees respond to the reasonable anticipation of the provider that their 
counter-party is going to give them something back in correspondence to their own 
contribution to the relation, i.e. their managerial services147. For that reason, this 
obligation apparently expresses the reciprocity norm in the management contract 
relation. 
On the other hand, fees are not the only obligation of the recipient under a 
management contract. Nevertheless, it is true that payment of fees constitutes the main, 
traditional and characteristic provision and contribution of the recipient to the relation 
and it constitutes a characteristic element that distinguishes management contract from 
other forms of managerial cooperation between two different corporate entities: as 
mentioned in the first chapter a management contract is a contract under which the 
management of the recipient is assigned to an external entity and the latter receives fees 
in return. A management contract can still exist without this element; however this case is 
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very limited and concerns special specific relations. Thence, fees’ payment not only 
defines the nature of the overall relation but the role of the recipient as well. 
In most management contracts, there is not a complete agreement in advance for a 
specific amount of fees, but the fee or at least part of it depends on specific results that 
have to be achieved and specific conditions148. More specifically, the compensation is 
normally analysed into smaller fees that is not obligatory to be mentioned in every 
agreement. Thus, fees could be assumed as one of the most “relational” obligations of a 
management agreement as they are characterised by apparent “incompleteness” 149 and 
adjustments and renegotiation play an important role150. The basic fee and the incentive 
fee are usually mentioned; the fee for professional commitment and the completion fee 
are usually mentioned in agreements with clauses on constructions; special fees usually 
appear in hotel management agreements or agreements with clauses on know-how 
transfer, while in every management agreement there are terms on remedy for expenses 
of the managing company. In detail, the compensation may include: 
• a basic management fee, which is the management company fee for fulfilling 
its main duties, as they are determined in the agreement 
• a commitment fee, that is usually paid upon signing of special pre-
agreements or when the agreement includes clauses on constructions, after 
the conclusion of an agreement and before construction works start, which 
generally operates as an advance payment 
• a termination fee, paid upon termination of the agreement or with the 
termination of construction period, when this is included in the agreement 
and acts as a safety clause by the assigning company, in case the management 
company does not comply with its obligations 
• special services fees, for services provided within the framework of 
agreement for administrative responsibilities assignment, but do not 
correspond to the basic management part, but in additional special services, 
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such as performing construction works, leasing of specific rights of industrial 
property, provision of maintenance services and technical support, public 
relation services and advertising, mediation for loan credits, etc. 
• an incentive fee, which functions as an incentive for the management 
company in order to achieve better results and it is usually determined as a 
profit percentage 
• remedy of any expenses and costs made by the management company during 
the agreement period and due to business management services provision by 
it, which we will analyse further below. 
 
Therefore, fees could be categorised into three large categories: fixed or stable fees, 
variable fees –depending on the provider’s performance- and compensation of provider’s 
expenses.  
Actually, the provider’s performance and the extent to which the parties will fulfil their 
initial goals, defines the measurement of the relation’s performance. The correlation of 
the providers’ fees with the degree to which they will manage to succeed their goals leads 
to the fact that both parties’ benefits become related to the overall relation’s performance 
and no potentially expected benefit remains standalone from the entire relation’s 
evolution and results151. 
Recent trends to management contracts emphasise more and more the second category of 
fees, almost substituting the first category152. In most recent contracts, the provider’s fees 
are defined as a certain percentage of the recipient’s earnings or of the earnings of the 
recipient’s sector, which is the object of the contract. In other cases, especially when 
management is not the only service provided (e.g. transfer of a special know-how), or the 
management assignment refers to a part of the recipient’s business or the recipient’s 
earnings cannot be totally assumed as a result of the provider’s performance (e.g. when 
the recipient has a good performance before the contract but needs to acquire a better 
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managerial know-how in order to improve it even more), this percentage is a part of the 
total (incentive) fees.  
Besides, the incentive fees are usually related to certain pre-set standards and goals, 
defined at the beginning of the relation153. Generally, it is difficult to quantify the whole 
spectrum of a management contracts’ goals154. Financial results, gross or net profit and 
turnover are the most common indexes about the relation’s performance and the factors 
that define the amount of incentive fees. When the scope of the specific relation focuses 
on some more special aspects of management, such as cost-cutting or an increase of 
market share, there can be used other and more special indexes and factors, related to the 
exact purposes that the relation is designed to serve155.  
Therefore, fees are adjusted to every specific relation’s objectives, as defined in the initial 
– or on-going156 - planning157. As no management contract can exist without some pre-set 
–although not necessarily fully defined- goals and a certain plan, fees are integrated into 
this total plan of the relation and are linked with the initial commitments of both parties –
the provider to succeed some objectives and the recipient to compensate for these and at 
the degree to which they are accomplished-. Furthermore, in this way the recipients can 
plan not only their own goals but their actual obligations as well, as they know in 
advance what they will have to pay, according to the circumstances. Thus, the incentive 
fees can be assumed as a pure form of reference to the implementation of the parties’ 
planning. 
On the other hand, relating fees with performance is a valuable tool for enhancing 
flexibility as well. Firstly, adjusting somebody’s obligations to the benefits that he/she 
receives is an essential element of flexibility – and reciprocity as well-. Moreover, apart 
from setting some initial goals, parties tend to re-negotiate their relation and especially 
re-examine their goals and their expectations –as their needs and relationship evolve- 
                                                
153
 I. R. Macneil, Many Futures, 763. 
154
 The difficulty in evaluating the performance is an indication that the norm of preservation of the relation is strong. 
Look to R. Austen-Baker, “Comprehensive Contract Theory: A Four Norm Model of Contract Relations", 225, 
Diagram. The issue of difficult measurability as an element of relational contract is also mentioned by I. R. Macneil in 
his twelve axes. “The Many Futures of Contracts”, 738-740. 
155
 Balanced Scorecard is a widely used system for such an evaluation. 
156
 above 17 and notes 52-53. 
157
 above 41. 
 58
from the relation. As they change priorities, they also change the indicators of managerial 
success, thus the parameters of the provider’s fees, so they can re-negotiate the overall 
relation in a much more flexible way, emphasise new factors and adjust the relation to 
their needs and priorities158. Furthermore, in this way, the parties – and especially the 
recipients- can be protected from uncertainties159, referring to the provider’s performance 
or external events, as they know that the fees will be always adjusted to the actual – and 
not just planned- results of the relation. If the providers’ performance exceeds initial 
expectations, then they will be adequately rewarded – and this is surely a good motive-, if 
the performance will not meet these expectations, the recipient will not be bound to a 
serious financial commitment –unrelated to its own expectations and planning- without 
reason.  On the other hand, the contract usually leaves space for some unpredicted costs 
that may occur for the provider and usually provides for their covering by the recipient 
apart from the actual fees. Finally, the termination fees –meaning fees paid at the end of 
the relation and according to the final overview of the overall relational performance- is a 
good tool that supports flexibility, as it relates this obligation not to the initial expected 
result of the relation but to the final –maybe revised, renegotiated and altered- final 
expected result. 
The emphasis on incentive fees links the providers’ performance with their own benefit 
from the relation, gives to them incentives for better results and relates their potential 
benefit with a certain amount of risk and securing the recipient’s position, as it constitutes 
the party that assumes most risk and cost as well within the management contract’s 
relation; thus makes the relation much more fair and allocates in a more even way risk 
and profit between both the parties.  
This allocation helps parties and mainly the recipient to build trust bonds between them 
and follow a co-operative and win-win strategy, as no counter-party is going to earn 
profit if the other will not earn either. In this way, conflicts that emerged under older 
practices –that focused on fixed fees- are avoided, as the recipient does not fear that the 
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provider is going to exploit the relation in order just to receive the fees without providing 
serious managerial effort and support160. Besides, the fact that both parties’ interests are 
linked in this way helps them improve the co-operation and communication between 
them, avoid conflicts and resolve disputes under a conciliatory spirit and maybe with less 
litigation. In other words, because of the way in which fees are calculated, the provider 
acquires a strong motive for the preservation of the relation and this motive is linked with 
a relevant motive for the avoidance and efficient resolution of relational conflicts. In this 
way the fees’ payment and its dependence on the relation’s performance is an element 
that promotes co-operation, mutuality, fairness and relational stability.  
Therefore, fee payment is characterised and defined by the norms of implementation of 
planning, role integrity, contractual solidarity, harmonisation of the relational conflicts 
and reciprocity. 
 
Obligation for Provider’s Integration into the Recipient’s Structure 
 
One of the basic consequential obligations of the management recipient refers to the help 
it has to provide, in order for the management company to become part of its structure. 
As we have already mentioned, the subject and scope of a management agreement is 
undertaking the management of another company and this is the reason why the basic 
provision of a management agreement is performance of managerial responsibilities of a 
company by another on behalf of the former. Therefore this integration is an essential 
prerequisite for the evolution of the relation and directly refers to the recipient’s role 
within the relation, as the party, which assigns its own powers and duties to the other; 
which “tolerates” the provider’s intervention within its own structure and which allows 
the relation to acquire a strong personal character and bond161. On the other hand, the 
fulfilment of this obligation, is anticipated as implicit by the provider, thus constitutes a 
rational expectation about its counter-party behaviour –besides, it is rational to expect 
that the recipient is interested in promoting such a relation- and it cannot be promoted 
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without this integration. As this integration responds to the provider’s anticipation 
standards about how the recipients are going to fulfil their obligations, according to the 
idea that they perceive about them, this obligation also responds to role integrity norm162. 
Within a management contract’s relation there is always an issue of exchange of powers. 
As already stated163, an exchange and a subsequent limitation of power are apparent in 
every contract, but this element strongly appears in relevance to this obligation in 
management contracts, in the following way. Provider takes over some of the recipient’s 
power and the extent of this power is constantly renegotiated within the relation. New 
rights of intervention and obligations of tolerance are created as the provider is integrated 
as managerial agent in the recipient’s structure with decisive powers and this transfer of 
power164 is the reason for the development of the provider’s fiduciary duties towards the 
recipient; therefore the role of power norm is underlined considering this obligation. 
Undertaking such managerial responsibilities cannot be done with a simple contract, but 
in order for the managing company to legally acquire any responsibilities provided in the 
management agreement, certain actions by the recipient need to be performed, which will 
give the provider the opportunity to manage the company on their behalf, i.e. to legally 
represent and manage their company. This type of legal establishment for the managing 
responsibilities to the management company that only the recipient company may grant, 
can be identified as integration of the provider in the recipient’s structure. This 
integration comes into stages, in any of which, the recipient actively gives over parts of its 
own powers to the provider, while these stages constitute a complete and continuous 
procedure, under which the provider obtains control of the recipient and it specifically 
obtains it, based on the recipient’s initial and continuous consent.  
 This ongoing consent is justified by the recipient’s presumable will to play its own role in 
helping the achievement of the relation165. On the other hand, this consent is limited to a 
certain degree, beyond which the provider is not going to tolerate any further 
intervention in its own structure and any further assignment of power to the provider.  
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The extent of this assignment depends on every specific relation’s individual goals, 
duration, qualitative characteristics –such as mutual trust- and specific planning, done in 
advance or during the on-going relation166. Anyhow, the recipients consent to give up 
some of their rights in advance; hoping for a prosperous evolution of the relation and this 
transfer of power is something that they eagerly accept since the early stage of initial 
planning till every other on-going planning. 
First, the managing company providing management services as a provider’s managing 
body has to be determined as a legal representative body of the board of directors by the 
provider. The recipient is obliged to perform all necessary legal actions –even a 
modification of its articles of association- in order for the management company to be 
legally assigned with managerial and representative powers. By signing a management 
agreement, the recipient undertakes implicitly to safely complete all necessary legal 
procedures for the assignment of managerial responsibilities to the provider167. 
The second stage refers to facilitating actual, inclusion of the managing company in the 
recipient’s organisational structure as a result of its active initial and ongoing consent for 
the results of the contract. The recipient has to assume any effort, in order to prepare its 
staff, managers, partners, organisational chart and decision making system, in order to be 
able to provide practical authorisation to the management company to perform its 
duties168. Failure in any of the above stages169 may comprise a reason for termination of 
the agreement, as a violation of the recipient’s obligations for cooperation with the 
provider for an efficient implementation of the agreement. 
Therefore, we observe that the procedure of provider’s integration follows a specific 
planning from the beginning of the relation, a planning which defines the framework of 
future cooperation between the two companies. This integration constitutes a primary 
obligation undertaken170 by the recipient and the way in which this obligation is 
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accomplished expresses the implementation of planning norm171, as it constitutes a 
prerequisite act from the recipient, in order that the provider can pay off. 
We consider that as opposed to the obligation of payment, the recipient’s obligation to 
include the provider in its structure is not just a provision but it may result in an obvious 
condition on which depends the whole relation. Without the fulfilment of such a 
condition, the parties neither can co-operate effectively nor can achieve the relational 
objectives. Their trust to each other falls, as falls their confidence that they can accomplish 
their goals and serious tensions may frequently arise, which may retract the holding 
together of the relational exchanges172. Therefore, provider’s integration in the recipient’s 
structure is an essential factor for contractual solidarity and for the preservation of the 
relation. On the other hand, as parties share powers and duties and their individual 
structures are merged, they build a strong basis for future constant co-operation, a basis 
that promotes the relation’s stability173. The integration of structures links their interests, 
makes parties understand that disputes may harm them individually, enhances trust 
between them and promotes the mutuality and sustainability of the relation. 
Therefore, the norms of implementation of planning, contractual solidarity, role integrity, 
effectuation of consent and creation and restrain of power play a major role in the 
formation of the content and scope of this recipient’s obligation. 
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Provider’s Obligations 
 
Some of these obligations are related to the provider’s fiduciary duties, while 
others refer to the mission and the exact goals that the provider explicitly assumed to 
achieve by the contract or constitute implicit means in order to achieve the goals of the 
relation. We preferred to examine in this chapter the obligations that can only apply to 
the provider, although there are some other obligations that mainly refer to the provider, 
however are of a bilateral character as they can also refer -to an extent- to the recipient as 
well. We do not examine the key and characteristic obligation of the provider for the 
management of the recipient, as this obligation is mainly regulated by corporate law and 
the provider’s role as a substitute of the recipient’s board of directors –so the range of its 
obligations is regulated by corporate law’s provisions- and as the exact spectrum of 
management duties is highly diversified and depends not only on the specific contract or 
relation but on actual situations and managerial issues as well. So an examination of the 
content of the corporate management as a contractual obligation could be very difficult to 
be examined, on the grounds of a contract law and norms-based analysis and should 
involve an extended application of management science and corporate law, issues that 
are irrelevant to the scope of our work.   
 
Staff Training 
 
One of the most important reasons for drawing up a management agreement is the 
undertaking of responsibilities by well-trained and experienced executives of the 
management company and the provision to the assigning company of people with skills, 
knowledge and qualifications that its own staff lacks of. This is why one of the first 
actions performed by the management company after signing the agreement, as 
mentioned below, is the selection, detachment and placement in the assigning company 
of the competent managerial and administrative staff (field staff). All the above become 
even more obvious in international management agreements, when in the agreement 
objectives, even if it is not expressly mentioned, the transfer of administrative and 
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productive know-how by the management company, which usually comes from the 
developed world, to the assigning company is included up to a point.  
The reason for that can be found in the fact that the main and central goal pursued 
by the relation of the parties in management contracts, refers to the achievement of all the 
prerequisites for the recipient to succeed better management performance. One key 
aspect of this effort and one key aspect of the provider’s role in the relation with the 
recipient are the acquisition and training of staff capable to perform in a more efficient 
way. The improvement of the recipient’s performance is not limited in the time frame of 
the relation with the provider, but the recipient expects that its own management will be 
improved in a permanent way after the end of the management contract and without the 
constant need for the provider’s directions. In order that the recipient’s management will 
be permanently improved the recipient expects that after the end of the management 
contract, its own staff will be of better quality. This expectation is even more important 
when a key element of the relation concerns know-how transfer; in order that this transfer 
could mean something for the recipient, it should have permanent results. So, the 
provider has to prepare the recipient’s structure and staff, in order to accept, integrate 
into their own enterprise and be able to take advantage from the transferred know-how 
and technology in a permanent way in future. All the above result to the fact that staff 
training is a sine-qua-non obligation of the provider, an obligation deriving from its own 
role in the relation –as the party that offers experience, management skills and know-how 
to the recipient and from the rational expectations of the recipient that the provider is 
going to fulfil its role in a complete way. Roles in the management contract’s relation are 
adapted to the nature of the relation, the common pursued objectives and the objectives 
that every party tries individually to pursue on behalf and for the benefit of the counter-
party174. And the procedure of providing adequate staff and training it in order to become 
able to contribute to the recipient’s management is crucial for every such relation and 
directly refers to the provider’s role. Besides, the recipient chooses a provider, according 
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to its assumed managerial skills175; these skills necessarily refer also to the field of human 
resource management and so, the recipient expects that the provider will take care that 
these skills are going to be “transplanted” to its own structure. 
Moreover, the provision and training of staff is usually a prerequisite for the 
fulfilment of the objectives of the management contract’s initial business plan. Any such 
business plan involves the improvement of the recipient’s managerial efficiency, the 
transfer of special technological or managerial skills and the achievement of some 
performance-related objectives by the recipient; all these goals cannot be reached without 
appropriate staff and appropriate staff is a major factor for the accomplishment of the 
goals included in the initial planning. 
The provision of staff to the assigning company that used to belong to the 
management company may be in favour of the latter, as this way it can ensure that the 
undertaken project will be completed in the smoothest possible and most effective way. 
This solution is also cheaper, in comparison to training from scratch the existing staff of 
the assigning company, something that would again demand participation by the 
management company staff, but it would delay the implementation of the agreement176. 
However, in practice, due to special legal regulations by the countries receiving 
management services and laws about tax incentives, parties are obliged, even when the 
assignment is about a specific project of high know-how level, to employ staff belonging 
to the assigning company and in fact domestic staff, something that is really noticeable in 
management assignment of public utility companies177. On the other hand, keeping the 
staff of the assigning company or employing domestic staff may be in the interest of the 
assigning company, which may keep this staff after the agreement is terminated, while 
the staff of the management company will be withdrawn. This way it will be able to 
integrate the knowledge gained by the management services of the managing company. 
Moreover, cooperation between the staff of the management company and that of the 
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assigning company might prove positive, as through such cooperation the assigning 
company’s staff is practically trained by that of the management company. 
Any dispute referring to the staff training could result to great conflicts within the 
relation. For example, there are some occasions when management companies neglected 
training of the staff, in order that the recipient will continue to need them and will not be 
able to end the relation without loosing great benefits. However, such a practice could be 
assumed as exploitative and could result to limited trust between the parties and 
endangers the whole relation. Trust and expectation that the provider will follow a most 
efficient as possible behaviour, in order to secure the recipient’s benefits from the relation 
are cornerstones for the relation’s stability178. On the other hand, if the provider refuses to 
fulfil such an obligation, the justifiable discomfort of the recipient and the difficulty in 
achieving the relation’s objectives may lead the relation to an end. Furthermore, the 
preparation of the recipient’s staff in order that the recipient’s management will become 
more efficient is usually an essential part of the recipient’s business plan’s 
implementation, an implied objective at which the recipient aims and a criterion 
according to which it chooses the provider.  
We should note that the management company’s responsibilities include the 
obligation to gradually replace their staff with staff of the assigning company before the 
agreement expires and often also undertakes the obligation to hire and train staff on 
behalf of the assigning company.   
In any case, according to the norms of contractual solidarity, role integrity and 
implementation of planning, even if the agreement does not provide for a specific 
training programme of the assigning company’s employees, the management company 
should provide them with training and undertakes the obligation to improve the level of 
the assigning company’s staff after the agreement expires. 
 
Know-how Transfer 
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One of the common objectives of an agreement for assignment of management 
responsibilities is the transfer of know-how from the management company to the 
assigning company. Such an agreement usually includes a special appendix about the 
terms and procedures for transfer of know-how, while quite often know-how not only is 
transferred from one company to the other, but both companies seem to share their 
know-how. In any case, know-how transfer necessarily includes its integration in the 
assigning company ensuring that the latter will be able to productively utilise it.  
However, a special fee can be agreed on for know-how transfer, while transfer may 
be agreed as non-definite and terminate upon management agreement termination179. 
The degree to which such obligations exist in a given management contract relation 
depends on the specific cause and scope of it and on facts related to the specific parties180. 
If a software laboratory in a developing country assigns its management to a renown 
foreign company, we could easily assume that it anticipates from the provider to provide 
technological know-how and R&D support, so that it could use it after the end of the 
contract. In this case, technology transfer is incident upon the role, competence and skills 
of the provider and upon the needs and expectations of the recipient. 
Transfer of know-how may be achieved in two ways, directly and indirectly; in the 
first case it is expressly provided by the relevant agreement between the parties, the 
obligation of the management company to provide the assigning company with a specific 
level of know-how as determined by the contract, while in the second case, transfer is not 
expressly provided by the contract, but it emerges by the obligations of the management 
company as a whole and by the scope of the agreement181. 
In direct know-how transfer, the know-how element is the core of the specific 
relation and the ultimate goal of it; it is also the main provision of the provider. It is clear 
that the provider is selected upon its technological competence and that there is one –at 
least- specific technological section, where the provider has a special knowledge and 
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which is the main object of the relation182. The role integrity norm in such circumstances is 
apparent as apparent is the “implementation of planning” norm. The parties mutually 
design an initial plan for this transfer, as this process can only be fulfilled in several 
subsequent stages, in order to be effective. Due to the nature of technology transfer such a 
procedure has to be planned in advance, by the technical and scientific decision-making 
units of both parties in cooperation together, and it includes many clearly technical 
aspects. The assigning company and the management company agree in advance that the 
former provides the latter with any necessary information, knowledge, technical skill and 
technical support for a smooth integration of all the above knowledge, together with 
appropriate staff training, so that this know-how to be productively used by the latter183. 
In many cases, when transfer of know-how is the main subject of the agreement for 
assignment of administrative responsibilities, there is great cost and it is very important 
for the assigning company, either an appendix agreement is drawn or a special contract 
for technology transfer, provision of rights of industrial property and technical support184. 
Moreover, the management company undertakes to provide the assigning company 
know-how upgrading based on developments in science and technology, even after the 
agreement termination and is also obliged to provide any useful information on know-
how exploitation, even when this is not included in the contracted know-how transfer. 
The management company may often be obliged to organise, provide with staff and train 
the research and development (R&D) department of the assigning company. 
We have to note that the management company, in such cases and especially in 
cases of enterprises with modern technologies, also undertakes the responsibility that the 
technology provided to the assigning company is consistent, at least at the time the 
agreement terminates, with all modern scientific and technological developments 
worldwide185, or else the whole relation will be endangered, as there will be no real 
benefit for the recipient. 
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On the other hand, as mentioned above, the management company undertakes 
mainly the obligation to train the staff of the assigning company, so that they are able to 
effectively perform their duties even after the management company withdraws. This 
way, when the management agreement also refers to the technological upgrade of 
productive and administrative processes of the assigning company, it is through staff 
training that indirect know-how transfer emerges186. In any case, such an obligation must 
be taken for granted, since the meaning and the usual scope of a management agreement 
have to do with the upgrade, via assignment to an external body, of skills, competitive 
advantages and strengths of the assigning company, through the special administrative 
on a first level and on a second level productive and technological know-how and 
experience of the managing company. Besides, managerial skills –even not of strictly 
technical nature- can be assumed as a sort of know-how that has to be transferred in 
order that the contract’s objectives could be fulfilled. So, following the same ratio, used 
concerning staff training we can result to the conclusion that role integrity and 
implementation of planning impose relevant obligations to the provider. 
However, management companies often suppress the terms about know-how 
transfer, even when it is the main subject and scope of a particular agreement, in order to 
protect their own interests. In such cases, even though there cannot be any obligations for 
know-how transfer according to the agreement text, it has to be accepted under the 
agreement meaning that such obligations arise according to the circumstances from the 
subject and scope of the agreement and productive reasons for its conclusion, at least 
from the part of the assigning company187. If not, there could be serious danger that the 
recipient’s trust will fall, the relation will be assumed as exploitative and it could easily 
result to a pre-mature end. As the know-how transfer issue is very sensitive for both 
parties, they should be extremely careful with the management of this transfer process, in 
order to avoid conflict and secure contractual solidarity. 
The norms of contractual solidarity, role integrity and implementation of planning 
are apparent as well, concerning both direct and indirect know how transfer. 
                                                
186
 H. Gunter, O. Nass, Management Know-How Transfer by multinational Corporations in South-East Asia, 33. 
187
 UN-Centre on Transnational Corporations, Management Contracts, 41 
 70
 
Preservation of the Interests of Receiver which are not related to the Contract 
 
Within the framework of the confidential and cooperative character of the management 
agreement, it would be wrong to consider that contracting parties’ duties are limited only 
in their strict contractual undertakings and obligations, which are mentioned in the 
agreement and define the relations between the parties.  
This contract is characterised by an intense bonding between the participating 
enterprises188. The obligations for both parties and the areas of cooperation, solidarity and 
mutual caring are much more and even not predefined, but they are open and are 
determined by any needs and problems that may arise. 
More specifically, the obligations of the parties have to do with the obligation of 
preservation of the other party’s interests, even when they are not part of the strict 
agreement scope.  
This means that initially the management provider and -to an extent- the client, are 
obliged to take any necessary action in order to protect and promote the other party’s 
business activity.  
This obligation derives from the duty of the parties to preserve their counter-parties 
interest and becomes vital due to the agreement’s confidential character189. From another 
point of view it derives from implied principles within the contract about promoting full 
and constant cooperation. Furthermore, both parties seek for a common scope and they 
benefit from mutual success and it is to their own interest if the other party’s interests are 
also promoted190. A strong partner may prove really helpful for our enterprise and a 
benefited and successful client is the best guarantee for our own success as their 
managers. 
The above obligation mainly refers to the provider’s role within the relation, as the party 
with the strongest managerial and consulting abilities and the party that assumes the 
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management, direction and protection as well of the other. It is true that as the providers 
assume powers of the recipient and rights of intervention and control, they also assume a 
protective role towards the recipient191. This role reflects what the recipients anticipate 
from their counter-party and its own reasonable expectations from the relation and forms 
a rational base of trust and confidence that the providers will act as efficiently as possible 
in order to protect the general recipient’s interests –and not only those related to the 
specific scope of the contract-. In other words, as the providers act as managers, agents 
and consultants of the recipient192, they are expected to fulfil a role similar to this of the 
board of directors or internal managers; thus they assume fiduciary duties193 and high 
standards of care194 are expected from them, while their relation with the recipients is this 
of a(n) –fiduciary- agent towards a principal. And this is the reason why, although the 
above obligation is rarely explicitly mentioned in such contracts, which usually just 
include a general clause about confidentiality, it still exists as an implied term. 
The obligation of preserving business interests that may be out of the scope of the 
agreement has a passive and at the same time active perspective. Concerning its passive 
perspective, each enterprise has to withdraw from any of its activities or participate 
indirectly or directly in somebody else’s activity that may damage the other, even 
reflectively. An aspect of this is the obligation of non-competition, which we will analyse 
below. Concerning its active perspective, it may range from the obligation of each 
enterprise to provide any information that becomes aware of and concerns the other, until 
provision of help with crucial issues, even when this is not mentioned in its contractual 
obligations.  
Such examples195 exist in cases of facilitation of the client, for finding temporary staff, in 
case of strikes in its enterprise, delivery of crucial information about competitors, which 
is gathered randomly through its out of office activities -without of course being able to 
reveal other clients’ business secrets- and consulting for important issues that may be 
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related to the client, out of the agreement scope if there is a need for it.  Within the 
framework of cooperation the provider has to do everything possible in order to help 
towards the recipient’s business success.  
Such obligations may be implied by the provider’s fiduciary role, but the agreement may 
also include clauses according to which the management provider undertakes a general 
obligation to help in any issue that its client requests help196, clauses that call for support 
for any activity of the provider197.  
In any case, the obligation for preservation of business interests of the other party, 
stresses the close cooperation and the intended unification and coexistence of the two 
different bodies, in terms of action for a common cause198. Besides, trust and 
confidentiality are essential prerequisites for the preservation of a relation in which one 
party transfers its own powers to the other. Provider’s negligence to protect its recipients 
and promote their own general benefit and interests is a factor of tensions within the 
relation, decreased trust and co-operation. Thence, this kind of provider’s obligation is 
closely linked with the norm of contractual solidarity. The existence of such a strong 
obligation distinguishes management contract from other forms of business partnerships 
and underlines the contract’s transformation into a complete and multileveled relation. 
Furthermore, this obligation is closely linked not only with the norms of role integrity 
and contractual solidarity –as shown above- but with the norm of reciprocity as well.  
This obligation derives from the apparent mutuality of benefits, risks and objectives and 
is related to the integration of the partners’ structures. The recipient not only assigns the 
exercise of its own rights and powers to the provider but pays fees to it as well; fees that 
usually are related to the recipient’s profits. It is rational to expect that the counter-party 
will do as much as possible to improve the recipient’s profits and general situation, it is 
rational to anticipate an extended degree of care concerning its full benefit, instead of just 
“doing what the contract mentions”, in order to receive the payment199. And we should 
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admit that the recipient after integrating the provider and paying the fees has little to do 
in order to help the improvement of its own situation apart from co-operating with the 
provider. All the rest responsibilities are assumed by the latter and the norm of 
reciprocity explains why these responsibilities should be assumed as concerning a much 
broader list of issues than those explicitly mentioned in the contract.   
In fact, what is required by the management company (to a greater degree) is nothing 
more or less than what is considered obligatory by a member of the Board of Directors or 
a management executive of the enterprise in terms of their special role in it, which 
however means taking any positive measures in its favour, even outside the framework 
of its typical duties. We should not forget that the basic task for the management 
company is to maximise the value of the managed company200 and this has to be done in 
any available medium and way. Therefore, we observe, that solidarity and reciprocity are 
indeed linked201 as this obligation shows. 
 
Obligation of Respect for the Philosophy and the Scope of the Enterprise 
 
Any decision and action of the management company, according to the above 
obligation, may not be against the objectives of the managed company as they are defined 
in its articles of association.  
Moreover, the business policy and any actions of the management company should 
comply with the general philosophy and some key aspects of the long term policy202 of 
the managed company.  
The management company has to respect any business particularities, such as if it is 
a public utility company, its social objective dominates, which must be considered by the 
former, or in the case of a tourist enterprise, its local character and traditions should be 
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respected, or in the case of an enterprise with strong social responsibility or ecological 
character.  
Furthermore, the provider should not alter radically the recipient’s enterprise scope 
– such as transforming a productive enterprise into a holding company- without the 
explicit consent of the recipient, despite of the fact of achieving better financial results by 
such a decision. Although a decision like it could seemingly promote the recipient’s 
interest and the objectives of the relation it could actually lead to negative long-term 
consequences for the recipient. In any relation of this kind, the provider should take into 
account that the relation’s object is the recipient’s own property and that the recipient’s 
consent for intervention is limited as already mentioned to a certain degree, mo matter 
what the results are. The provider can play just a consultative role regarding such 
changes and may not be granted the power to decide for them.  
The above obligation is linked with the role of the provider as a fiduciary towards 
the principle-recipient203. It is actually the result of the fact that the providers –given the 
powers assigned to them by the relation- are indeed actually able to alter the scope and 
philosophy of the recipient, in order to adapt it to their standards of production204, while 
this power transfer leaves the recipient weaker and less able to react to such actions. So, 
the provider should not take advantage of its own advantageous and powerful position 
in the relation, in order to alter elements of major importance for the recipient’s corporate 
identity and should fulfil its duties carefully and in the less harmful way for the recipient. 
This is the reason why such obligations, although rarely mentioned in the contract, are 
implied. 
We should mention that such practices of providers, which alter the scope and 
philosophy of the recipients, are common in international management contracts and 
especially in developing countries205.  
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Therefore, the providers should always take into consideration that any recipient is 
not only function as a cash cow but it is integrated in a given social and economical 
environment, is related to specific stakeholders and constitutes an entity with its own 
individual philosophy and structure. These relations and this position of the recipient 
cannot be harmed due to a short-term profit –mainly for the provider. So, any 
management contract should be planned and implemented with a sense of respect 
towards the recipient’s environment, stakeholders206, employees, values and principles 
and the relation should integrate any element of the given social context. Furthermore, 
the general value of respect to the stakeholders of a company and the respect to the 
philosophy of the recipient –as an expression of respect towards its own autonomy- 
constitute a platform of supracontractual and external to the contract broad values that 
implicitly bind the provider207.  
Moreover, such a respect is a prerequisite for the trust of the recipient towards the 
provider and its consent towards the transfer of managerial powers. Disrespect towards 
the non-financial priorities of the recipient will lead to severe tensions of the relation, 
negative reactions from the recipient’s internal and external environment, stakeholders, 
employees and shareholders and all these may result to dangerous relational conflicts 
that may endanger the contractual solidarity and the preservation of the relation208. For 
example, there may arise severe strikes or pressure towards the recipient against the 
provider that will cause a great conflict between them, which will be difficult to resolve in 
a co-operative way209; these factors will force the relation towards an end. Besides, such a 
practice on behalf of the provider will also imply a continuous relational conflict, 
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concerning the priorities of the relation and a disagreement towards the parties’ 
individual interests and objectives.  
Therefore, the fulfilment of this obligation by the provider constitutes an essential 
prerequisite for the development of a harmonious and stable cooperation and the 
tolerance of its intervention by the recipient210. As analysed above, this obligation is 
related to the norms of preservation of the relation/contractual solidarity, harmonisation 
of the relational conflict, harmonisation with the social matrix and supracontract norms. 
 
Obligation of Recipient’s Integration in Provider’s Business Networks 
 
It is very common in management contracts, that the provider assumes the obligation to 
incorporate the recipient into its own business networks, strategic alliances and 
partnerships. These collective business schemes involve distribution or supply channels, 
R&D exchange partnerships, partnerships in collective projects and co-production 
networks, financial, marketing, promotion or advertisement networks and function 
according to their own rules211 as “minisocieties”212. This integration aims at the cost 
reduction for the recipient (economies of scale) or at the accomplishment of a know-how 
transfer or at the improvement of the recipients’ sales or at the improvement of the 
recipient’s credit worthiness and financial status. Therefore, the above obligation is not 
only important for the interests of the recipient but highly related as well to the goals of 
the relation and the accomplishment of the provider’s mission. 
 During the phase of choice of provider and initial negotiation of the contract, the 
recipient takes into account the potential provider’s ability and consent to provide access 
to such networks. The provider’s participation in such networks is counted as an 
important feature of the provider’s general standing in business world and its suitability 
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as manager and constitutes an advantage for the choice of a specific provider, given that 
the recipient will benefited from this situation. It is assumed that as the provider will 
assume the control of the recipient in order to achieve certain business goals and improve 
the recipient’s performance and competitiveness, it will use its own networks for the 
interests of the latter. As the provider’s mission is to secure the recipient’s permanent 
managerial improvement it is assumed that the first will work for the recipient’s stable 
integration in these networks and that this integration is an inherent aspect of its overall 
role in the relation –no matter what the other aspects of the provider’s role are-, even if 
the provider will not earn immediate profit from this integration213. Therefore, role 
integrity is a major factor that defines this obligation. 
Moreover, at the initial stage of the relation, when the parties together plan their mutual 
long-term goals and strategy, they take into consideration such networks as means for 
their common strategy’s implementation and success. Sometimes, they explicitly refer to 
these networks in their contract –especially when the participation in these networks is 
crucial for the relation, such as in marketing management contracts-, while in some other 
cases they explicitly exclude the recipient’s access to them –especially when these 
networks are not related to the goals of the relation-.In most cases the parties do not refer 
explicitly in the contract to the networks, however they assume that the provider will 
choose the best solution including the use of the networks, in order to implement the 
relational strategy214.  Therefore, the recipient’s inclusion in the provider’s strategic 
business networks is an efficient means for the implementation of the relational planning. 
By the recipient’s integration, new rights –concerning the network- and duties arise, 
concerning not only the recipient but the provider and the rest parties of the network as 
well. For example, the parties of the network will be obliged to sell to the recipient raw 
material at low costs or the recipient will be obliged to use the network’s distribution 
channels or the provider will have to share know-how with the parties of the network. 
The free choice of the parties about their goods’ distribution and promotion, sales policy 
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and counterparty’s selection will be limited, according to the network’s rules and the 
parties may be obliged to offer a preferential treatment or tariff for their goods to the 
network’s parties or an option of preferential service in comparison to non-included in 
the network third parties.  In some cases, all the parties of the network will be under a 
management contract with the central provider and in each of these contracts there will 
be a provision about the parties’ integration in the network and their rights and duties as 
parts of it. However, it may not be obligatory for the management contract to provide 
these rules as they can be of non-contractual nature215. Then, the bilateral obligations 
between provider and recipient are expanded towards all the parties of the network and 
both parties have to comply with the network’s rules, which they possibly have to accept 
at the management contract’s signing. The parties’ decisions, strategy and policies are 
defined not only by the individual relation between provider and recipient but by the 
multilateral relation and the general rules of the network as well216. So, the individual 
relation between the recipient and the provider and the overall relation between the 
network’s parties will be defined by creation of new powers and restrain of others and by 
supracontract norms, referring to the network’s rules. 
Furthermore, this integration and especially the rise of new duties and rights for the 
parties, effectuates the relative initial consent of them; concerning the provider to 
integrate the recipient in its own network and concerning the recipient to accept the rules 
of network, respectively.  
As the whole planning of the relation and the selection of provider will be influenced by 
the recipient’s integration in these networks, this integration becomes crucial for the long 
survival of the relation. If the provider neglects this inclusion or encumbers the 
recipient’s practical integration or refuse to offer the privileges of the network to the 
recipient, then the relational goals will be endangered, the trust and cooperation between 
the parties will be undermined and the recipient may doubt about the provider’s 
eagerness to share powers, privileges and competitive advantage. Therefore, the practical 
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integration of the recipient into the network constitutes a prerequisite for the contractual 
solidarity and the preservation of the relation. 
Finally, this obligation is related to reciprocity as it constitutes part of the provider’s 
counter-obligation in exchange for the recipient’s payment, assignment of rights and 
powers and concession of control to the provider. As mentioned above, this integration is 
a means for the accomplishment of the provider’s role as a paid manager and a fair return 
for the recipient’s trust, cooperation and payment. Although, the two counter-provisions, 
integration into the network and cooperation and payment cannot be compared, the first 
can be assumed as an even and rationally anticipated return for the latter217.  
So, implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, role integrity, creation and 
restraint of power, contractual solidarity, preservation of the relation, supracontract 
norms and reciprocity are the norms that mainly define this obligation. 
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CHAPTER D: BILATERAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
Bilateral obligations are of equal importance as unilateral, especially as most of these 
obligations refer to behaviours expected by both parties, given the mutual effort for the 
achievement of common goals –defined by the relation- and the respect of the 
interdependence between them. Moreover, bilateral obligations are mainly related to 
fiduciary duties, especially concerning the provider, deriving from its special role as 
entrusted manager of the recipient. Most of the bilateral obligations mainly concern the 
provider as the party that plays the role of the manager of the recipient; however we 
prefer to assume these obligations as bilateral, because they concern to a secondary extent 
the recipient as well, whose behaviour, given the circumstances, can be crucial for the 
provider’s interests and for the relation’s success as well. 
 
Obligation of Confidentiality 
 
The trusted relation created by the management agreement imposes on both parties 
and mainly on the management company the obligation of confidentiality. This means 
that it has to keep in secrecy any confidential information known due to its status, always 
act in its client’s interest, perform no action that could damage these interests and mainly 
not try to benefit against the assigning company either on its own account or on third 
parties’ account, of the confidential information received while performing their duties. 
Such an obligation is essential in order to preserve the overall relation as the relational 
scope and the formation of parties’ roles have to do with the promotion of both parties’ 
general interests. Any breach of confidentiality results to reduced trust and lack of 
cooperation and harms the foundations and the stability of the relation. The above 
obligation is also related to the obligation for omission of competitive action and 
especially an action on their behalf or actions on behalf of third parties that relate to the 
scope of the company, unless a special permit has been granted by the company. 
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Although confidentiality is a common explicit term in most management contracts, 
this obligation of confidentiality derives from the fact that the provider acts as a manager 
of the recipient and assumes the role of the board of directors of the latter218. Furthermore, 
the providers are also major business partners of the recipients and to a certain extent 
they contribute sources (skills, knowledge, staff and sometimes working capital) to the 
recipient’s branch or enterprise that falls within the management contract, acting also in a 
way similar to this of a strategic investor, however in a much more special way; so the 
provider’s specific role indicates the latter as a fiduciary of the recipient. Thus, we can 
deduct the existence of a fiduciary relation between providers and recipients, inspired by 
many kinds of fiduciary relationships219, in which the parties’ role resembles these within 
a management contract relation. Confidentiality is a primal fiduciary duty, closely linked 
with the general duty of loyalty and a confidentiality obligation binds the directors and 
managers of a corporation220. Duty of Loyalty requires fiduciaries to put the corporation's 
interests ahead of their own221, especially when conflicts of interest arise222.Corporate 
fiduciaries breach their duty of loyalty223 when they divert corporate assets, 
opportunities, or information for personal gain224. This gain may concern the gain of 
another recipient with which the provider has a management contract relation; so the 
provider is obliged not to transfer information between its different recipients225, apart 
from the case of recipients that share information and are included in a network. 
Moreover, it is usual that specific Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) accompany 
the contract between an individual manager and a corporation. On the other hand, we 
prefer to characterise this obligation as bilateral as the recipient as well, under specific 
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circumstances, may come in touch with specific confidential information concerning the 
provider. For example, the recipients learn much about the providers’ know-how and 
although this know-how may be an object of transfer to the recipient, it must be kept 
confidential towards third parties. However, as the most common case is that the 
confidential information concerns the recipient, the confidentiality obligation mainly 
refers to it. 
Therefore, the whole social and legal context of the management contract relation 
recognise the fiduciary role of the parties within a management contract and requires that 
the parties fulfil the duty of extended care and loyalty and the duty of confidentiality 
towards each other as a result of the assignment of administrative duties226. And these 
duties derive from the parties’ role in the relation, in relation to each other227. This legal 
and social context, the specific scope, objectives and general nature of the relation and the 
role of the parties within it, indicate confidentiality as an appropriate and fair behaviour 
that should followed by both parties, as they get to trust each other and reveal their 
confidential information to each other in order to promote their cooperation, preserve the 
relation and improve the accomplishment of their common and individual goals. The 
fiduciaries have to avoid harming their primary’s interests, such as breaching the duty of 
confidentiality. This is a fair return for the counterparty’s trust and cooperation; a 
behaviour that underlines reciprocity as it is related to substantial fairness and a more 
general concept of evenness and fairness rather than just procedural issues228. 
So, the norms of role integrity, contractual solidarity/preservation of the relation, 
propriety of means and harmonisation with the social context are closely related to the 
obligation of confidentiality. 
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Obligation for Provision of Information 
 
The nature, the goals, the general context of the management agreement and the 
relational framework that it creates as well, require the management company to inform 
the management recipient about management development and other issues arising 
during the management period. The provider is also obliged to provide any information 
related to the course of management, the financial status of the business229, to inform the 
managed company about any problem or difficulty that may arise during its 
management. On the other hand, the recipient is also obliged to provide the management 
company with any information referring to the object and goals of the contract, 
concerning the financial, managerial and structural status of the enterprise under 
assignment. If the provider hides information then the recipient will not be able to 
evaluate the provider’s work and decide about the relation’s future. If the recipient hides 
information, then the provider will not be able to set clear managerial and financial goals, 
decide whether it will accept or reject to assume the contract, take the right 
administrative decisions and negotiate its own fees and the specific terms of the relation. 
Any hide of information will finally result to confusion, lack of cooperation, inconsistency 
between measures taken and goals to be accomplished and failure. Furthermore, if any 
insecurity or hide of crucial information is revealed then the trust between the parties and 
the foundations of the relation will be shaken and damaged, as parties will show that 
they are eager to sacrifice the long term fate of their relationship for a short term 
individualistic benefit230. 
 The recipient has to provide information mainly at the beginning of the relation, 
while the provider has to inform the recipient about its intended actions at the beginning 
and keep the recipient informed during the relation on a regular basis and at the end of 
the contract. So, the breadth of information that has to be provided to each other and the 
timing of this provision depends on the parties’ role within the relation. The provision of 
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clear and adequate information is an expected behaviour by both parties and constitutes a 
prerequisite for the fulfilment of the mutual planning and goals231.   
In most cases, the obligation of regular updates or information provision at any time 
required may be included in the formal contract. However, this obligation can also be 
implied as a fiduciary duty, deriving by the role of the provider as a manager and 
director of the recipient and of the recipient as business partner of the provider, as the 
provision of information is a means to promote the counterparty’s interests and the 
mutual interests as are set-up by the contract and the overall relation.  It can be assumed 
as linked with fiduciary duty of loyalty232, as it is related to the obligation of avoiding 
conflicts of interest and a disclosure of information usually serves an individual interest 
of the party that hides information, which is against the other party’s interests. 
This obligation is also related to reciprocity norm. The provision of information from 
the provider to the recipient can be viewed as a rational reciprocation for the assignment 
of the recipient’s administration to the provider, as the recipient anticipates that it will 
have the right to know whatever concerns its own enterprise, which was entrusted to the 
provider. On the other hand, the provision of information from the recipients to the 
providers is a reciprocation233 for the providers’ involvement in the recipients’ enterprise, 
as the providers rationally anticipate that as they accepted or just planned to dedicate 
sources for the business success of the recipients, they have the right to know everything 
that will help them evaluate the cost, risk and potential for success of the contract and 
they will receive every information that will help them to structure their strategy for the 
benefit of both parties. Furthermore, adequate information is also a prerequisite for fair 
bargaining234, negotiation and efficient allocation of risks, costs, duties and powers within 
the relation and during its different stages. It is also linked with the element of mutuality 
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existing in the contract, as information is essential in order that mutual goals can be 
achieved.  
On the other hand, a lack of sincerity could be interpreted as an effort of the 
insincere party to promote its own interest against the mutual, take advantage of the 
other party’s ignorance, use unfair means in order to succeed its goals and 
opportunistically exploit the overall relation in favour of its own profit. Even if the party 
that shows such behaviour does not intend to harm the other party or exploit it, it “plays 
against the rules” and does not follow the commonly acceptable patterns of behaviour, so 
it harms the relationship235. Prior and complete information at every stage of the relation 
from both parties is a procedure that is assumed as appropriate, no matter what the 
intentions of the parties are. Besides, sincerity is the base of trust and disclosure of any 
information available between the contracted parties is a proper behaviour within a 
relation that integrates one company into the structure of another. Therefore, contractual 
solidarity, role integrity, propriety of means and reciprocity are related to the obligation 
of provision of information. 
 
 
 
Prohibition of Rights and Liability Transfer from the Agreement for Assignment of 
Business Management Responsibilities 
  
One of the most typical terms of agreements for assignment of business 
management responsibilities provides that contracting parties are not allowed to transfer 
to a third party any rights or liabilities arising from the agreement. An exception may 
apply in case there is an earlier written consent of the contracting party236. This clause 
fully conforms to the general features of such agreement, with privacy and confidentiality 
being one of them. On the other hand, privacy of the agreement forbids any claims by the 
management company towards the assigning company to be assigned to third parties. 
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We need to note though, that at least in our opinion, this cannot be the case for a payment 
claim, since a payment is also valued in money terms.  
The company undertaking management is of course allowed and usually required to 
use third parties (persons or corporations) for fully performing its managerial duties and 
implementing the business plan of the contract, as for example managing executives sent 
to manage the assigning company or manufacturing companies, in order to build new 
infrastructure. These parties however, act as agents and not as alternative service 
providers and their range of duties has to be limited to technical issues and not extending 
to administrative duties without the permission of the recipient237. 
This obligation has to do with the character of management assignment as a result of 
the consent of the recipient for the provider’s involvement in its own structure and 
business and the transfer of powers belonging to the recipient’s administrative board to 
the external provider. This consent is limited to a specific entity the management 
company and after the recipient has taken into consideration much information referring 
to its capability to succeed the goals of the relation, its trustworthiness and probably 
goodwill and brand-name. The element of inter-parties trust and cooperation is 
significantly intense; therefore the relation has a personal and individual character238. 
The provider is expected to fulfil the agreed goals by acting as the manager of the 
recipient. So it is expected to act on its own, as would be expected for a natural person-
manager. The nature of their role “generates expectations of what their behaviour will 
and should be”239. Transferring rights and duties to third parties may not be expected if 
the parties have not agreed on it and such a transfer could be assumed as a negation of its 
own role, in the same way as if a CEO assigned its own duties and liability to another 
person after a contract between them240.  
Furthermore, in such a close relation the identity of the parties that will perform the 
contractual obligations should be clear, in order to enhance mutuality, avoid confusion, 
lack of trust and reduced cooperation. Under a management contract relation, in which 
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the recipient does not know which company will exercise the management and the 
provider does not know which company will pay its fees, no party will be eager to 
assume significant risk and sacrifice its own short-term profit for a mutual long-term 
benefit (mutuality as a term needs to refer to two or more specific persons in order to 
exist)241. Therefore, the prohibition of such transfers without the permission of the 
counter-party enhances contractual solidarity242. 
On the other hand it also helps with the harmonisation of relational conflicts, as 
parties will be less willing to compromise in favour of the preservation of the relation, 
resolve their conflicts under terms of mutual understanding and avoid litigation, if such 
transfers occur. Besides, by such transfers internal conflicts of the relation may be 
transformed to external conflicts and involve several parties that will claim no 
commitment by the management contract. So, there will be always the fear that the 
relation will result to an unpleasant and harmful “game” of liability disclaimers between 
the parties of the relation and the third parties, use of the third parties’ involvement as a 
means to avoid the fulfilment of contractual obligations and exploit them for 
opportunistic behaviours. Trust and mutuality243 are going to be lost and the parties may 
prefer to terminate the relation, because it will include many uncertainties. Furthermore, 
any renegotiation of the relation will be very difficult, as the parties will have lost their 
trust and the effect of this negotiation will be limited as the contract’s implementation 
will have to involve third parties that will negotiate their role and obligations under 
different individual negotiation with the management contract’s parties. Thus, by 
transferring rights and duties the relation will be fragmentised to several individual 
relations, unrelated to each other as they will involve different interests, goals and 
parties; a fragmentation that will burden much any effort for the harmonisation of 
relational conflicts244.  
It is easy to understand that under such a fragmentation, reciprocity will loose its 
sense as well, as the parties will not anticipate that the counter-party will compensate 
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them for their contribution to the relation, as they will not be sure which party will be 
liable or eager for this compensation and to which party they will owe their 
compensation; or if they are sure, this party may be different party from this, which they 
anticipated their compensation from. Apart from substantive fairness (reciprocity), 
procedural fairness (propriety of means) is implicated as well, regarding this obligation245.  
The transfer of liabilities and rights from one of the parties to a third party, not only may 
be illicit –as we will explain below- but may seem –because of the reasons we have 
already explained- tricky to the counterparty and outside the normal standards of 
behaviour in such close relations of this kind, thus crossing beyond acceptable bounds246. 
So, any such transfer should always take place after an explicit and specific consent of the 
counterparty, in order that the transferor’s behaviour will be proper. 
Besides, management contract involve a transfer of powers, by creating 
administrative rights for the provider and restraining the powers of the recipient on its 
own enterprise for the sake of the relation’s mutual goals247. Such a transfer of rights and 
liability will not be covered and legitimised by any consent, while it will constitute a 
creation of power for the third party without being a party of the relation and a further 
restrain of power for the party whose rights refer to the obligations transferred to the 
third party. It will not be able to directly exercise them, as there will be a distinction 
between the person that is expected to fulfil the obligation and the person that is actually 
going to fulfil it. On the other hand, we could view this prohibition of rights’ transfer as a 
restrain of parties’ freedom to exercise their powers by transferring them (it is a kind of 
exercise), and thus restraining their own future choices248.   
Finally, we believe that no relational contract can work if new parties are allowed to 
enter the relation without the consent of both the initial parties, as any relation is created 
on the mutual consent of some parties for its formation; a consent that gives the 
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counterparty the ability to take actions –even not predefined completely- that bind the 
parties’ own powers249. 
So, reciprocity, propriety of means, contractual solidarity, harmonisation of the 
relational conflict, creation and restrain of power, effectuation of consent and role 
integrity are linked with this prohibition of rights and liability transfer from a party to a 
third party without the consent of the counter-party. 
 Regarding business networks under management contract, whole or partial 
substitution of the management company by a subsidiary or other affiliated company is 
usually observed, while there are often clauses250 in the relevant contracts specifically 
allowing such a substitution. Such a substitution resembles an internal regulation of 
relations and liabilities in between the companies of the network, while when a new 
company enters its management is actually assigned collectively to the network251. The 
network’s self-organisation may impose its own individual rules and general norms and 
customs as well - not particularly contractual-252 about rights’ and liability transfer and 
restrict this transfer within the companies forming the network. This prohibitions and 
restrictions complement the relation’s content and the contract may also explicitly refer to 
a collective network agreement about such issues253. So supracontract norms are apparent 
considering this kind of obligation254.  
Furthermore, corporate law may often regulate the terms and the legitimacy of a 
liability transfer255 and especially the transfer of managerial and administrative powers 
and relevant fiduciary duties256. The issue of substitution of the provider by third parties 
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and of liability transfer to third parties is largely regulated by mandatory rules of 
corporate law or rules from self-organised system. Thus, the general social context of the 
relation and especially its legal environment (the legality of the specific contractual 
terms257) is crucial considering this obligation. 
 
Collaboration Obligations 
 
We have to note that since management is related to various factors such as financial, 
environmental, social but also human, an agreement for assigning of managerial 
responsibilities cannot be dealt as provision of simple representative authority, but as 
participation of the provider in various roles (leading, social, informational, guiding), 
related to the assignee. This is why the reasons of a failure agreement usually cannot be 
explained immediately and responsibilities cannot be easily defined and allocated.  
Therefore, there is an obligation for collaboration of both parties and especially for 
preparing the recipient to include the provider in the legal and business structure of 
business management provision. However, the meaning of collaboration obligation does 
not only consist of the obligation for provider’s inclusion in the recipient’s structure. It 
also includes provision of information from one party to the other. As stated above258, 
information must be provided both by the management company to the recipient and by 
the recipient to the management company; this is a compulsory term for their 
collaboration and for the success of the agreement.  
Moreover, according to the duty of care259, which characterises the parties’ fiduciary 
relation, especially as an assignment of such an important responsibility like management 
and as a means for a company to fully invest in another, it is obvious that even if such an 
obligation is not mentioned in the agreement, both parties are obliged to consult each 
other before performing any action provided by the agreement and make any possible 
effort for a continuous collaboration with each other, in order to take the best possible 
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decision. The scope of this collaboration is that administrative decisions concerning the 
recipient will be made after a totally, if possible, mutual agreement of both parties. 
The collaboration obligation has three main features.  
Firstly, it equally concerns both parties. On the one hand, the management company is 
obliged to inform, communicate and be in direct contact with the assigning company, by 
providing any necessary explanation in relation to performing of duties on its behalf and 
any advice related to the actions required to be taken by the assigning company for an 
efficient implementation of the agreement. On the other hand, the assigning company has 
to provide any necessary information to the management company in order to perform 
its duties, effectively include it in its structure and at the same time support it reasonably 
in administrative level during the period of undertaking its duties and also cover any of 
its managing executives who can trust and may assign them managerial responsibilities. 
Therefore, each party’s collaboration is assumed as an even return for the other party’s 
collaboration260. 
Secondly, the obligation of collaboration is continuous and necessary not only during the 
period of the initial management assignment, but for the whole period by the time the 
parties start preparing to perform the agreement up until the cooperation between them 
expires. As a result of prior collaboration of the counterparty, the other party has also to 
show a similar behaviour in future261. 
Thirdly, the obligation of collaboration is not clearly predefined, it is open and may be 
defined according to the circumstances and needs of each case, but it always aims to the 
effective performance of duties by the contracting party and the best possible 
implementation of the agreement scope. The obligation of the parties for collaboration 
and ensuring of the best possible cooperation does not have to be mentioned or analysed 
in the management agreement, but simply arises from the interpretation of the 
agreement. Moreover, the existing legal context of the relation –based on good faith, 
fiduciary duties (usually assumed as implied terms)262, business efficacy263 or strict 
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necessity264 (both assumed as bases for generation of implied terms) or other legal 
principles depending on each jurisdiction and each different interpretation and approach- 
may also dictate a collaborative behaviour. Besides, apart from legal rules, social mores 
and norms265 may also favour a behaviour of collaboration and cooperation on behalf of 
the parties, instead of selfish and indifferent to the counterparty’s opinion approaches.  
This collaboration constitutes a behaviour anticipated as a fair and proper means of 
conducting the relation266, as parties actually co-invest sources on the recipient’s 
enterprise267. However, not only the parties anticipate this collaborative behaviour as 
proper268, but the overall social environment of the relation as well demands that the 
parties will constantly cooperate, in order to reduce the risk for the recipient that the 
provider will abuse its position269.  
Conceptually, this obligation may not be characterised as an enforceable term but as a 
prerequisite for the implementation of the agreement. We could describe it not as a single 
and distinct obligation but rather as a total constant behaviour, anticipated by both 
parties.  
Constant collaboration in every stage of the relation and concerning every aspect of 
management is essential for the stability of the relation, for the recipient’s tolerance to the 
provider’s interventions and for the promotion of trust, mutuality and cooperation 
between the parties270. This collaboration proves the parties’ dedication to the mutual 
goals and to the promotion of common long-term interest instead of individual short-
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term interest and strengthens the "belief in being able to depend on another"271; therefore 
it enhances contractual solidarity.  
Besides, harmonisation of the relational conflict is also enhanced272 as collaboration in a 
management agreement means that the parties tend to choose communication instead of 
conflict and prefer to resolve their regular and non-regular disputes by compromise, 
mutual consent and by avoiding any means that could harm their counter-party or 
neglect its own priorities and suggestions, no matter what are the uncertainties that exist 
within the relation273. As such collaboration is implemented, both parties treat the 
management as an issue of common concern and the company under management as an 
asset of mutual interest, as they take the decisions concerning it together, acting as 
partners and participants in success or failure. This behaviour proves that management 
contract creates new types of participative powers on the company under management 
and effectuates the parties’ consent to share duties, responsibilities and administrative 
powers concerning the direction of the enterprise and the implementation of the initial 
and ongoing mutual planning. Effectuation of consent is apparent for an additional 
reason, given the fact that the recipient shares its powers by its consent, however this 
consent depends on the provider’s collaboration with the recipient, so it is limited to the 
extent that the provider and the recipient resolve all issues together and under 
cooperation with each other.  
Moreover, collaboration leads to less confusion, efficient allocation of duties, powers and 
risks274, clearer goals for both parties and is a prerequisite for the success of the relation. 
Such behaviour shows that both parties respect their counter-party and aim at a win-win 
strategy, removing the fears about potential exploitative practices.  
Collaboration also improves the ability for better design and function of the relation and 
more efficient decisions and management and problem-solving, as the parties join their 
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forces and management teams, share their knowledge and thus improve their 
brainstorming and their ability to resolve managerial problems. In this way, uncertainties 
are efficiently responded275, unpredictable problems are solved more easily and situations 
that call for flexible management276 are addressed. By collaboration, the parties manage to 
re-adjust their planning and objectives to changing conditions277 and re-design their 
relation and contractual obligations after formal contract278, according to external and 
internal environment of the relation279; therefore flexibility is enhanced. 
So, collaboration obligations are linked with many norms, such as reciprocity, 
harmonisation with the social matrix, harmonisation of the relational conflicts, flexibility, 
contractual solidarity/ preservation of the relation, propriety of means, effectuation of 
consent and creation and restraint of power. 
 
Non-Competition Obligation 
 
As mentioned, management agreement is a type of close cooperation between 
enterprises, i.e. the management provider’s company and the management recipient’s 
company. As in any other form of business cooperation, there are also in this case issues 
concerning competition between the cooperating companies. 
Specifically, in the management agreement, the company undertaking the 
management of another company is informed about any strong and weak points of the 
latter, gains access to its intangible assets, business relationships, networks, confidential 
information and know-how; an access that is not allowed to other enterprises and derives 
from the managerial merge between the parties. 
It is obvious that the management company by acquiring full access to details 
concerning the managed company, details that only the Directors are aware of, is found 
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in a favourable position and, by taking advantage of such information, may be found in 
an extremely favourable and advantageous position in terms of competition. 
Moreover, since the management agreement is a form of business cooperation, there 
is a common and mutual objective that both parties try to achieve. For the achievement of 
the objective, both parties and especially the one found in a more favourable position, 
which in cases of management contract is usually the management provider company, 
have to make several concessions and set certain limitations in their business activities. 
After all, through the relevant agreement, there is a certain bonding of the two companies 
and the actions of each party may positively or negatively affect the other. The 
interdependence of interests combined to the common cause both parties aim at, create a 
loyalty duty to both parties, as we have mentioned above280. 
One of the aspects of such an obligation, which we will discuss in this sub-chapter, is 
the obligation of non-competition. We choose to investigate confidentiality separately, 
although related to confidentiality, as confidentiality obligation may arise as not related 
to competition issues and conflicts of interests, as for example when the provider 
discloses secrets of the recipient without any intention to earn profit from this disclosure. 
The obligation of non-competition is a restriction of financial freedom, which is 
initially acceptable by law in some cases as neither party can take advantage by the 
relation, in order to gain a general competitive advantage against the other party.  
The non-competition obligation mainly concerns the provider, as it acts as the actual 
manager and director of the recipient; however it has to be assumed as a bilateral 
obligation. The recipient as well can take advantage of the provider’s know-how, 
organisation and other competitive advantages, in order to compete against it in future. 
This obligation derives from the fiduciary duty of loyalty281 and specifically the 
fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest282. Loyalty283 means that the party has to act in 
the best interest of the counterparty and in case of a conflict of interest that might benefit 
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the first party more than the latter -if it ends up one way- then the first party/fiduciary is 
expected to act in the absolute best interest284 of the latter/principal285. A fiduciary is not 
allowed to acquire a profit, benefit or gain286  from the relationship in circumstances of 
conflict of duty and interest, in circumstances of conflict of duty to one person and duty 
to another person or by taking advantage of the fiduciary position287. If a business 
opportunity arises to the provider outside of its role in the relation, but as an individual, 
the provider is expected to refuse the opportunity and try to ensure it –if possible- for the 
recipient288. Furthermore, the provider is obliged not to transfer competitive advantages 
of the recipient to other recipients and the recipient is obliged not to transfer the 
provider’s know-how to related companies or partners of its own, except if the provider 
agrees289. 
Self-dealing is a distinctive case of forbidden competition290. It is the conduct of a 
fiduciary who takes advantage of his/her position in the principal’s organisation, in order 
to act for his/her own interests rather than these of the principal, by dealing with itself in 
a transaction in which he/she acts on behalf of the principal291. However, we should admit 
that self-dealing is not only acceptable but sometimes necessary or provided by the 
agreement and the scope of the relation as well, within management contracts relation292. 
So, the extent to which self-dealing breaches the non-competition obligation, depends on 
the interest of the principal, the scope of the self-dealing, the intentions of the fiduciary 
and how this self-dealing serves the objectives of the relation.  
In many jurisdictions, non-competition obligations are provided by law within the 
framework of certain agreements and contract types such as commercial representation 
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contract, dormant partnerships, franchising, joint venture agreements293 etc294. Besides, in 
many jurisdictions non-compete clauses or covenant not to compete295 (CNC) are very 
common considering employment contracts296 and other types of contracts –mainly long 
term and highly relational297-.  
Therefore, the obligation of non-competition is not only a legally acceptable contractual 
obligation, when it is expressly provided by the parties as a term of the management 
agreement –although it is mainly a standard clause in most such agreements298-, but it can 
also be an implied term, arising from business ethics, fiduciary character of the relation 
and duty of loyalty between the cooperating contracting parties, which binds the parties 
even if this is not expressly provided by the agreement between them. 
This obligation is acceptable299 to the extent that it does not comprise an 
unreasonable restriction300. What can be considered as reasonable301  usually is 
determined by the following criteria: 
• duration of obligation, geographic scope and function302 
• necessity303 
• legitimate business interests304 
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The duration of the clause validity, due to its nature and its scope, is not limited to 
the time that the management agreement will be valid for, but it extends to a further time 
period that is necessary for protecting any interests of the contracting parties, which 
within the framework of their cooperation have shared business secrets, know-how and 
resources305. This time period may be determined by the agreement, or emerge from the 
scope, duration and use of the agreement, as well as the business activity of the 
cooperating enterprises. Considering the provider, non-competition concerns the time 
period during and after the end of the relation, while, considering the recipient non-
competition mainly concerns the period after the end of the management. 
The breadth of the activities under limitation of competition has two dimensions. 
First, there is a spatial one, related to non-competition in specific geographical regions306. 
The spatial limits of the clause should be defined according to the type of activity. For 
example in case of an agreement for a company’s management operating in the field of 
software production, the spatial limits of the clause should be very wide, as its product 
can be easily launched in the market worldwide. The other dimension refers to the type 
of activities for which a non-competition obligation exists. It would be extremely binding 
and not reasonable if the clause of non-competition is valid for all fields of corporate 
activity, even those that are not subject of the agreement. However, when the managed 
company develops its business in many fields related, connected and even 
interdependent to each other, the clause should be valid for all interrelated activities. So, 
any commitment, whether related to space, time or activities issues, has to be limited and 
to be defined by the nature, subject and scope of the agreement. 
In relation to the existence of such clause in management agreements, we can 
observe the following. 
As shown above, corporate law, fiduciary duties, business ethics, general legal 
principles, business and legal practice in relevant types of relations and the whole social 
context show that non-competition is a standard for management contract relations. This 
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social context shows as well which the limits and the specific dimensions of that clause 
should be.  
In case of an agreement for a company’s management assignment, the scope of 
justification for the clause authorisation refers to the contractual commitment of the 
parties, from which also derives the obligation to pursuit a common objective. The 
common objective, as mentioned above, is related to the appropriate and effective 
management of the managed company and through this company to the achievement of 
agreed business and financial objectives, defined in each case307. 
We believe that in the management agreement, such a clause may be included for 
the following reasons. Firstly, due to the common objective, which fulfilment the parties 
are contractually bound for. This is a cooperation between independent enterprises, a 
cooperation that cannot be established and operate without such obligation. In other 
words, competition may cancel any meaning of cooperation and effort for mutual 
benefit308, i.e. the scope and legal grounds of the agreement. Therefore, we could claim 
that the obligation for non-competition derives immediately from the relational grounds 
of the management agreement and is highly related to contractual solidarity. Moreover, 
the clause is allowed because the contracting parties of the agreement are benefited by its 
implementation and its enhancement, which is sought through the clause 
implementation. Therefore, by undertaking such an obligation, they also protect their 
own interests.  
In addition, the management provider supports its management services and the 
payment is what it takes in return not only for the services provided but also for the 
resources used for offering such services and any other action taken to the success of the 
agreement, with the obligation of non-competition being one of them.  
The management company should also take into account during negotiations about 
its payment, the anticipated profit that might had, if it could benefit by operating in the 
same field with the assigning company, even if it had not undertaken its management. 
This means that by the non-competition obligation, there is some loss of profit for the 
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parties, but the scope of the relation supports it and this way such an obligation is 
justified. So, non-competition constitutes an implementation of reciprocity. The limitation 
of the parties’ freedom for business is imposed as an even and substantially fair309 return 
in such relations regarding the parties’ overall contribution, trust and involvement; a 
behavior anticipated as rational and self-evident310, given the scope and nature of the 
relation, its usual long-term character, the mutuality of objectives and the 
interdependence between the parties311. 
Moreover, the contracting parties are free to develop their business activities in any 
other field of the market, except for the one that the managed company develops its 
business activities in, or in case of a partial management agreement, in the specific 
business sector.  
The agreement does not bind the parties only in relation to performing several 
actions, but also for a certain behaviour, which apart from actions may also include 
omissions. On the other hand, this obligation does not mean that the parties have not a 
right to participate in the market, but that they are not allowed to compete with each 
other. Therefore, the object of reciprocity –limitation of competition- is closely related to 
factors presented above (duration, extent, scope, necessity, business interest etc) and its 
extent is defined, in order to be even, i.e. reasonable and adequate312. 
Especially in case of a network of companies operating under a common brand 
name and management, the obligations of non-competition are even more bilateral due to 
general networks norms, as the management recipient may not operate competitively in 
relation to the network, where it has been developed. In this case, competition would 
cause problems in the company’s relation to the management company and to the rest of 
the network, i.e. the rest of management recipients. The clause may also bind the parties 
of the agreement in relation to third parties, if the third parties are in any way related to 
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any of the contracting parties. This way competition against suppliers of the contracting 
parties, buyers, distributors and stakeholders in general may be forbidden. The same may 
also apply against corporations that are strategic investors or shareholders of any of the 
two contracting parties. In the above situations, the related companies usually form a 
structure that could fit the concept of “minisociety”313, with its own rules, the most 
important of which has to do with the limitation of competition between them314. 
This facilitates a smooth integration of each party to the organisational and financial 
structure of the other and also helps to avoid arguments and problems315, which may 
affect non contractual relations (often interdependent relations) with key business 
partners, cause great trouble and cancel the scope of the agreement. In this way non 
competition is related to supracontract norms and to the harmonisation of relational 
conflict as well. Furthermore, the importance of non-competition for the harmonisation of 
the relational conflicts is highlighted by the fact that it is related to internal conflicts of 
interests within the relation316. 
It is clear that the management agreement may result to various commitments, 
mainly for the management provider, which should be taken into consideration when it 
decides to draw such an agreement. It is obvious that non-competition constitutes a major 
restrain of the parties’ powers317, as they are obliged to avoid any financial or commercial 
activity falling in the spectrum of competition, thus limiting their business freedom. And 
the reason for such a restraint is the preservation of the relation, the enhancement of 
mutuality, the achievement of the relational goals and the emphasis on long-term mutual 
interest than on short-term individual profit. 
Therefore, contractual solidarity/ preservation of the relation, creation and restrain 
of power, harmonisation of the relational conflict, harmonisation with the social matrix, 
reciprocity and supracontract norms are related to this kind of bilateral obligation. 
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NOTES ABOUT CONCLUSIONS 
 
The matrix (Appendix B) restates what we have already described in the previous 
chapter. Actually, the matrix presents the appearance of norms within each of the 
different obligations, which we examined. In order to evaluate firstly the application of 
norms (and therefore of norms based relational contract theory) to management 
contracts, second the utility of each norm in management contracts, we tried to sum up 
the total number of appearances for each norm in every obligation, unilateral (provider’s 
or recipient’s) and bilateral. Moreover, we examine this matching under a dual model: 
based on MacNeil’s norms and based on Austen-baker’s comprehensive model of four 
norms. Although we used the first model for our analysis, in order to analyse extensively 
the concept of norms and their application, we also take under consideration the second 
shorter model, in order firstly to depict the application and significance of the different 
categories of the norms and second to test if this model may summarise the MacNeil’s 
model in a comprehensive and simpler way. 
Examining the table above, we can reach the following conclusions: 
 
- The obligations examined may be distinguished into two categories –apart from 
unilateral and bilateral-. The first one involves obligations, the content of which 
mainly refers to certain –usually predefined or easily assumed- actions or 
omissions, while the second concerns obligations, the content of which mainly 
refers to a specific –and more general- overall behaviour. We do not imply that 
some of the obligations may be accomplished just by actions or without any 
actions (that is impossible). For example, know-how transfer cannot be 
accomplished just by specific training programmes, transfer of patent rights etc, as 
it also involves a constant interaction between the parties; however its core mainly 
refers to specific actions and the overall relative behaviour has a complementary 
role. On the other hand, the obligation for provision of information certainly 
includes an obligation for specific actions (reports within prearranged periods), 
however it is mainly characterised by behaviour of continual and mutual 
information. The most characteristic obligation of the first kind is fees’ payment (as 
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it includes nearly no behavioural aspect), while the most apparent obligation of the 
second category is the obligation for collaboration (as it has a very general and not 
easily predefined character). So, an obligation can be characterised according to the 
main element of it, if it is behaviour or an action. According to our opinion, 
obligations 1 to 5 and 12 (because non-competition agreements are mainly 
accomplished by predefined and specific omissions of actions) belong to the first 
set, while obligations 6 to 11 belong to the latter. We will not assume that the first 
set of obligations is more practical than the latter, or that the first refers to more 
discrete obligations, while the latter to more relational obligations. However, we 
can conclude that the first mainly refers to the specific provisions/objectives of the 
relation, while the latter mainly refers to the overall relational framework; 
furthermore the second set is also related to fiduciary duties (look to the 
Appendix). Moreover, we can observe that the first set concerns more obviously 
the unilateral obligations, while the latter mainly concerns the bilateral obligations. 
On the other hand, we can easily observe that the (relational contracts theory) 
norms apply almost equally to both groups of obligations, no matter if they 
concern actions or behaviours. That is rational, considering that no actions can be 
cut of the whole relational and behavioural framework and that shows that the 
relational norms theory provides a good framework for the explanation of all 
kinds of obligations in a business relation and is not limited to the general terms 
that regulate a general framework of cooperation and mutual protection of each 
other’s interests. 
- Norms equally apply to both unilateral and bilateral obligations, however the type 
of applying norms changes. Considering unilateral obligations implementation of 
planning and role integrity are very apparent, while considering bilateral 
obligations all norms apply apart from implementation of planning. 
- Preservation of the relation and Contractual Solidarity (they coincide as we 
examine a relational type of contract) appear in every obligation (unilateral or 
bilateral). That means that they are highly significant and characteristic for this 
type of contractual relationship. Their coincidence also highlights that simply 
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speaking, contractual solidarity has the same content as preservation of the 
relation, when we analyse a contract with a highly relational character. 
-  Role Integrity is the second norm, considering its appearances in different 
obligations. However, it appears in almost every unilateral obligation, while it is 
not so dominant in bilateral obligations. This fact may mean that role integrity 
mainly concerns specific obligations that relate to each party’s different (therefore 
unique) role in the relationship. 
-   Implementation of planning –regarding unilateral obligations- is less important 
than role integrity, however significantly important, although it does not appear in 
bilateral obligations. This may mean that implementation of planning is related to 
the obligations that concern each party’s individual role and provision to the 
relation and constitute the achievement of the substantial content of the relation. 
On the other hand, this shows that role integrity has a much broader scope, 
although it mainly coincides with implementation of planning regarding unilateral 
obligations. 
- All the other norms –except of the implementation of planning and contractual 
solidarity/preservation of the relation- (we leave flexibility aside) appear mainly 
equally in the set of bilateral obligations.  
- Propriety of means appears relatively frequently in bilateral obligations, although 
it does not appear at all in unilateral obligations. That may be explained by the fact 
that this norm may mainly apply, in order to regulate the general procedural 
framework of the relation, while it does not fit in obligations that refer to the actual 
performance of it318. 
- Creation and restraint of power and effectuation of consent coincide almost in 
every occasion; something that shows that these two norms have a complimentary 
to each other’s content and may not easily be separated.   
- Reciprocity seems equally important considering both unilateral and bilateral 
obligations. This shows that this norm of substantive fairness has a great 
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importance as it can cut across the whole spectrum of the relation’s obligations, no 
matter if they are of a discrete or a relational character, unilateral or bilateral. 
- Flexibility rarely appears. That is interesting considering that it is very important 
in the relational contracts theory. However, this fact may show that it is very 
difficult to distinguish its own content and scope from other norms’ content; so it 
seems that the argument that it is not actually a norm but a prerequisite for the 
effectuation of all other norms319 may be affirmed. 
- Generally, it seems that harmonisation of the relational conflict, propriety of means 
and harmonisation with the social matrix are apparent mainly regarding the 
bilateral obligations, the role of which is highly related to the maintenance of a 
system that allows the constant cooperation, the fairness of the relationship, the 
protection of both parties’ interests and the compliance to general values. 
- The most frequently apparent norms (and significant as well) in the whole 
spectrum of obligations are preservation of the relation (contractual solidarity), 
reciprocity, creation and restraint of power and role integrity, as it seems that most 
obligations are related to these norms. Trying to explain the above, we assume that 
preservation of the relation is very important, as the whole relation is characterised 
by great interdependence and a deep link between both parties’ decisions and 
interests, which have as a result that the relation depends on almost every decision 
and action of the parties. Moreover, trust is very important for the relational 
solidarity due to the specific characteristics of the relationship, while the fulfilment 
of every obligation of the parties influences the trust between them and 
consequently the whole relation as well. Reciprocity is also related to this issue of 
trust. Regarding the norms related to substantial fairness, reciprocity plays the 
most important role. Without the assumption that each party is trustworthy and 
will respond to the fulfilment of the counter-party’s obligations, the relationship 
cannot last long. The interdependence is so great, that even the fear that the other 
party will not respond may affect both parties’ interests. Therefore, we can also 
observe that reciprocity is also related to the preservation of the relation, as role 
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integrity also does. Role integrity secures the fulfilment of expectations about the 
counter-party’s respective obligations, which is a very important issue, given the 
following factors: the great reliance of each party on its counter-party’s obligations, 
the long-term character of the relation, the difficulty in replacing the counter-party 
and the very different status between each party’s expertise, knowledge and 
power of action (e.g. the provider’s integration into the recipient’s structure 
depends totally on the recipient’s power and actions, while the know-how 
provision depends totally on the provider). All these factors lead to the 
requirement of clear allocation of powers and responsibilities. If both parties will 
not perform well in their role, also responding to their counter-party’s 
performance (reciprocity), the relation will easily fail. The importance of the power 
norm, on the other hand, can be easily explained, given the fact of the merger of 
control and transfer of vital powers on the undertakings under management. 
There must be certain factors that will help the clear allocation of control, will 
define and limit this power transfer.   
- On the other hand, it seems that other norms appear less frequently (although not 
less important). Harmonisation with the social matrix, for example, is apparent, 
but we cannot distinguish it –as a separate appearance- in most obligations. We 
think that this is due to the fact that management contracts are tailor-made 
contracts, mostly dependent by the parties’ will and goals and less by regular 
factors, defining common exchanges, although there still exist some obligations 
that directly derive from these factors. Second and most important, this norm is 
usually –concerning our research- covered by other norms, referring to the 
preservation of the relation or fairness. Moreover, it does not appear in obligations 
constituting the “technical part” of the relation (staff training etc). The same 
conclusion is even more apparent regarding supracontract norms, as they are 
assumed to constitute a more intense form of the previous norm, appearing in 
relational contracts. Effectuation of consent is also apparent, however its scope is 
usually covered by the power norm, as every allocation and transfer of power and 
control assumes a prior consent of the parties. Implementation of planning appears 
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strongly in certain obligations, however it does not appear frequently in the whole 
range of obligations; it mostly concerns obligations related directly to the goals of 
the relation, expressed usually explicitly and liked with specific actions of the 
parties, deriving from the initial technical business plan of the management 
contract. Propriety of means appears frequently in bilateral obligations and in 
obligations, which set the standard of behaviour for both parties. It does not 
appear as frequently in the whole contract as reciprocity, as the latter can also 
characterise obligations referring to specific actions (x will do this if z does that) 
and has a more general application. However, in our analysis is also underlined 
that the standard of propriety depends on the contract’s specific scope (e.g. 
collaboration obligations). Harmonisation of the relational conflict cannot be easily 
traced separately, as in most occasions it is absorbed by the more general scope of 
preservation of relation. Besides, we cannot have solidarity while there are 
relational conflicts, so the resolution of these conflicts is a prerequisite and 
inherent element of preservation of the relation. There are some obligations, 
however, such as non-competition, where the element of the relational conflict is 
so strong that this norm can appear separately as an important element. However, 
we tend to agree with Austen-Baker’s view, that this norm along with preservation 
of the relation can be integrated into one single norm. We noted our observations 
about flexibility above. Lastly, we observe that supra-contract norms do not 
appear frequently, however we believe that they have a relative importance in the 
management contract relationship, as management contracts frequently lead to the 
incorporation of a company into a business network. In conclusion, we observe 
that the core norm in management contracts’ obligations is preservation of the 
relation and that all the other norms, regarding management contracts, appear 
more or less related to this norm. We relate this conclusion to the contract’s long 
duration and to the fact that its success and results can only be shown after a 
significant period, during which the parties have to cooperate. A solid relationship 
will lead to positive results for both parties, while these results will also lead to the 
preservation of the relation. 
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- As we observe, the 4 out of 5 norms that were suggested by MacNeil as 
“relational”, meaning preservation of the relation, role integrity, propriety of 
means (concerning bilateral obligations) and supra-contract norms (relatively) are 
indeed significant in management contracts (we explained about harmonisation of 
the relational conflict), as we analysed above. This observation seems to affirm 
MacNeil’s argument about these norms as specifically important in contracts with 
high relational element.  
- Regarding the application of the 4 norms model, we can firstly observe that it 
generally leads us to the same conclusions as the more analytical model, while its 
simplicity is very obvious. 
- However this model may also lead us to further results –in comparison to the 
analytical model-. First, it makes even more apparent that the 4 norms application 
is equal to both unilateral and bilateral obligations and in both behavioural and 
actions (or omissions) based obligations. Second, it clearly depicts that satisfaction 
of performance expectations and preservation of the relation are the most 
important norms in unilateral obligations, while the significance of harmonisation 
with the social context and substantial fairness seem to show their significance in 
bilateral obligations and in behavioural obligations set. Third, it is very interesting 
that the (MacNeil’s) norms that constitute the 4 norms model’s norms usually 
appear together. For example, it is usual that 3 or all of the 4 norms that constitute 
the “satisfaction of performance expectations” appear in specific obligations. That 
means that their content and scope often coincides –without decreasing their 
individuality-, so Austen-Baker’s choice to integrate them into 4 groups seems 
useful and not at all wrong. That may not be the case for “harmonisation with the 
social matrix” norm; we explained the reasons for that above, while an additional 
reason is that supracontract norms have a very special content as intensification of 
harmonisation with the social matrix320. Moreover, the “harmonisation with the 
social matrix” norm has the fewest appearances, and this may mean that it should 
be reassessed whether it should constitute a separate norm in a 4 norms model or 
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it should be absorbed by another, if similar results derive from similar research on 
other relationships. 
- On the other hand, we should note that in two cases, the 4 norms model did not 
succeed to depict the significant non-appearance of a norm in a specific set of 
obligations. We refer, firstly, to the implementation of planning, which does not 
appear in bilateral obligations –neither in behavioural obligations-, although the 
“satisfaction of performance expectations” appears equally to both sets of 
obligations, therefore the 4 norms model could not depict the substitution of this 
norm by other norms of the same “family”/ comprehensive norm, especially 
effectuation of consent/power norm (role integrity nevertheless appears in both 
sets of obligations). Second, propriety of means does not appear in unilateral 
norms, although “substantial fairness” is represented in this obligation’s category 
by reciprocity. 
- However, generally speaking, 4 norms model helps us reach the same results as 
the MacNeil’s norms model, without complicating us much. When we analysed 
each norm’s appearance in each obligation, it could save us from frequent 
repetitions, from frequent co-appearances and coincidences of some specific norms 
and from the burden of investigating whether a norm appeared, although it was 
highly related to another also appearing or whether the slight differences between 
two norms made possible for them to appear separately. It is obvious from all the 
above that some of the MacNeil’s norms are so highly related to each other that 
they could be absorbed by each other or analysed together; that conclusion 
supports every effort for a simpler and more comprehensive norms model.   
- On the other hand, no matter which model we will choose, norms seem very 
apparent in management contracts and obligations’ content and scope seem to be 
successfully related to specific norms. Moreover, in no case a specific obligation 
was related to less than four norms out of the 12 examined or less than two out of 
the 4 norms model. This seems to mean that each obligation cannot be related just 
to a single norm. This also highlights the norms’ individual and collective 
importance. If an obligation was related just to one norm that would mean that 
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maybe the relational contracts norms theory cannot apply to at least this 
obligation. The fact that many norms usually apply to an every obligation can lead 
us to the conclusion that all the norms together can build a complete explanatory 
mechanism for these obligations, while they retain a specific individual meaning. 
On the other hand, it is impressive that on the average each obligation is related to 
6 norms out of 12. This may also mean that the norms system as a whole is very 
important and apparent in management contracts’ obligations, as the different 
scope of different norms is combined, in order to support every specific obligation. 
- On the other hand, the above conclusions mean that management contracts were a 
good paradigm for the test and application of norms theory. The primal 
conclusions of the second chapter are affirmed by the norms’ application that 
showed that relational element is highly apparent in management contracts. We 
have to remind that management contracts were chosen as a type of business 
cooperation contracts, so the conclusions above may also appear in other contracts 
with a strong cooperative element. 
- However, we have to admit that given the limitations of our research, there are 
certain questions that cannot be replied by it, although our research could provide 
material for a further relevant analysis. Firstly, although there are strong 
indications about the value of a simpler norms model, further research should 
show whether a simpler theory could substitute MacNeil’s norms model. Second, a 
further research could indicate which norms’ content can be totally absorbed by 
others. Third, a further analysis could move forward concerning the relation 
between fiduciary duties and specific norms. Fourth, we think that it would be 
very useful if a similar research could be conducted concerning other contracts 
with a highly relational character or other –mainly business- contracts with a 
strong cooperative element. It would be interesting to check if the results would be 
similar, concerning the total application of the norms model and each norm’s 
distribution. Fifth, we have to note that regarding the issue of many norms’ 
appearances in every obligation; we assumed that it may underline the highly 
relational character of management contracts and the significance of the norms 
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theory. On the other hand, it could also mean that some norms’ application is so 
self-evident that the whole theory may not lead to any results. Our opinion is that 
in order to check whether the norms theory has an important significance or not, 
we should also check whether the norms’ application differs from contract to 
contract and from relation to relation. Therefore, we think that it would be very 
interesting to conduct a similar research concerning other types of relationship, 
without the cooperative element being so apparent and compare it to the 
conclusions of our research. 
- Nevertheless, we think that generally speaking this research succeeded in proving 
that: 
a) in long-term relations in which the element of cooperation and interaction are very 
apparent, norms theory’s application is quite strong   
b) norms model may be simpler and more comprehensive than MacNeil’s, at least in 
order to apply them to a specific type of relationship 
c) some norms usually tend to coincide with others and their content overlaps 
d) each norm usually has a different scope of application as other tend to apply solely 
to unilateral or bilateral or highly behavioural obligations and other tend to apply 
to the whole spectrum of obligations. 
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APPENDIX A 
DIAGRAM OF THE OBLIGATIONS FROM MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACTS ANALYSIS UNDER A RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 
THEORY FRAMEWORK 
 
We include below a series of obligations of the parties of a management contract, 
unilateral or bilateral, concerning either the provider or the recipient or both. We do not 
include the provider’s obligation for management of the recipient, because of its 
complexity and of being divided to several other obligations. 
We try to justify each of these obligations, based on the 4 norms model you suggest in 
your “Comprehensive Contract Theory” article and on the 10 contractual norms, 
suggested by MacNeil. The first column describes the nature of the obligations according 
to which party they concern (provider/recipient/both), the second column names the 
obligations and also mentions which of them are usually explicit or implied and which 
are linked with fiduciary duties mainly of the provider (although it is possible that these 
obligations also concern the recipient as well). The third one links them with some of the 
4 norms described in your article and the fifth one matches them to some of MacNeil’s 
norms. The sixth column tries to explain in a few words why these obligations are mainly 
matched with these specific norms.  
We examine some of these obligations under the framework of the contractual norms, 
without claiming that the matching of obligations and norms is exact or totally accurate 
or includes all norms involved (the exact matching may continue to be a matter of 
debate), however believing that this matching, is generally close to reality and can be 
justified in a rational way. 
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1. Provider’s 
Integration in 
Recipient’s Structure 
(usually explicit) 
 
 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations 
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
a) implementation of planning 
b) effectuation of consent 
c) role integrity 
d) creation and restraint of power 
e) contractual solidarity 
f) preservation of relation 
The recipient has to efficiently incorporate 
the provider in its structure. It is a constant 
process based on mutual consent and active 
behaviour on behalf of the provider.  The 
parties share powers and duties, are 
integrated in a common and structural 
framework, therefore a fundamental and 
stable basis for cooperation is built. 
RECIPIENT’S 
OBLIGATIONS 
2. Fee 
Payment based on 
Provider’s 
Performance 
(usually explicit) 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) substantial 
fairness 
a) role integrity 
b) harmonisation of relational 
conflict 
c) reciprocity 
d) flexibility 
e) contractual solidarity 
f) preservation of relation 
Manager’s fee is adjusted in a flexible way 
to its performance, thus linking both 
parties’ benefits together, solving relative 
disputes, giving incentives for cooperation 
and enhancing mutuality. 
1. Know-how 
Transfer 
(usually explicit) 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations 
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
a) role integrity 
b) contractual solidarity 
c) preservation of relation 
d) implementation of planning 
In order that the relation produces future 
and stable results for the recipient, the 
provider has to transfer know-how. This 
transfer is usually an essential part of the 
recipient’s business plan’s implementation, 
an implied objective at which the recipient 
aims and a criterion according to which it 
chooses the provider.  
2. Obligation 
of Staff Training 
(usually explicit but 
not as often as it 
should) 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations 
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
a) role integrity 
b) contractual solidarity 
c) preservation of relation 
d) implementation of planning 
Similarly as above (about know-how 
transfer). 
3. Obligation 
of Recipient’s 
Integration in 
Provider’s Business 
Networks 
(some times explicit) 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) 
harmonisation 
with the 
social matrix 
d) substantial 
fairness 
a) implementation of planning 
b) effectuation of consent 
c) role integrity 
d) creation and restraint of power 
e) contractual solidarity 
f) preservation of relation 
g) supracontract norms 
h) reciprocity 
The recipient’s incorporation in the 
provider’s networks is usually an important 
part of mutual business planning and the 
foundation of inter-parties cooperation and 
involves mutual concessions on behalf of 
both parties (adjusted to their specific role) 
and allocation of duties and rights referring 
to the network, in order to succeed the 
recipient’s full membership. This element is 
often interacting with the whole spectrum of 
relations between the other parties of the 
network between the provider and the 
recipient and the network’s structure itself. 
This incorporation is accomplished by a 
mutual effort and consent of both parties 
and constitutes an essential objective for 
both parties.  
4. Obligation of 
Respect for the 
Philosophy and the 
Scope of the 
Enterprise 
(almost always 
implied) 
 
LINKED WITH 
FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 
a) 
preservation 
of relation 
b) 
harmonisation 
with the 
social matrix 
a) harmonisation of relational 
conflict 
b) contractual solidarity 
c) preservation of relation  
d) harmonisation with the social 
matrix 
e) supracontract norms 
This obligation constitutes an essential 
prerequisite for the development of a 
harmonious and stable cooperation and in 
order that the recipient tolerates provider’s 
intervention in its structure. Furthermore, 
such behaviour is also dictated by the need 
of the management transfer not causing 
problems to the recipient’s stakeholders.   
PROVIDER’S 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
5. Preservatio
n of the Interests of 
the Recipient which 
are not related to the 
Contract 
(almost always 
implied) 
 
FIDUCIARY 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) substantial 
fairness 
a) role integrity 
b) contractual solidarity 
c) preservation of relation 
d) reciprocity 
The recipient has to anticipate that the 
provider will protect its interests even when 
these particular interests do not fall in the 
contract’s spectrum. This is an expression 
of the mere contract’s transformation to a 
complete relation and concerns the provider 
to the extent to which, given its usual 
advantageous position, it can promote the 
recipient’s interests.  
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1. Obligation 
of Confidentiality 
(usually explicit) 
 
FIDUCIARY 
a) 
harmonization 
with the 
social matrix  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) substantial 
fairness  
d) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
 
a) harmonisation with the social 
matrix  
b) contractual solidarity 
c) preservation of relation 
d) reciprocity 
e) role integrity 
This obligation directly derives from the 
provider’s fiduciary duties, is essential for 
the building of a stable relation of mutual 
trust and cooperation and is expressed by a 
mutual promise that none party will betray 
the other’s sensitive information. 
2. Obligation 
for Provision of 
Information 
(usually explicit) 
 
LINKED WITH 
FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 
a) 
preservation 
of relation 
b) substantial 
fairness 
c) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
 
a) contractual solidarity 
b) preservation of relation  
c) propriety of means 
d) reciprocity 
e) role integrity 
This obligation constitutes an essential basis 
for constant cooperation and for just 
allocation of duties and liability and 
promotes trust and stability. 
3. Prohibition 
of Rights and 
Liability Transfer 
from the Agreement 
for Assignment of 
Business 
Management 
Responsibilities 
(usually explicit,  
but some times the 
contract includes 
contrary provisions) 
a) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) substantial 
fairness 
d) 
harmonisation 
with the 
social matrix 
a) creation and restraint of power 
b) contractual solidarity 
c) preservation of the relation 
d) harmonisation of relational 
conflict 
e) reciprocity 
f) supracontract norms 
g) harmonisation with the social 
matrix 
h) role integrity 
i) effectuation of consent 
j) propriety of means 
This prohibition, which constitutes a 
limitation of parties’ freedom, although it is 
usually dictated by corporate law or even a 
business network’s self-organisation, is also 
related to the nature of the relation. It helps 
parties build a stable relation of trust, as 
they can anticipate that their problems will 
be resolved by their interaction and they do 
not have to fear that they will have to deal 
with an irrelevant entity, thus proving the 
relation’s distinctive personal and exclusive 
character. 
4. Collaboration 
Obligations 
(usually implied) 
 
LINKED WITH 
FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 
a) 
harmonisation 
with the 
social matrix  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) substantial 
fairness 
d) satisfying 
performance 
expectations  
 
a) preservation of relation 
b) contractual solidarity 
c) creation and restraint of power 
d) propriety of means 
e) harmonisation of relational 
conflict 
f) harmonisation with the social 
matrix 
g) flexibility 
h) effectuation of consent 
i) reciprocity 
Constant collaboration in every stage of the 
relation and concerning every aspect of 
management is essential for the stability of 
the relation, for the recipient’s tolerance to 
the provider’s interventions, for the smooth 
resolution of regular and non-regular 
disagreements and conflicts and for the 
flexible and efficient re-adjustment of goals 
and objectives. Such an obligation is also 
usually dictated by corporate law and the 
need for the reduction of the risk that the 
provider will abuse its position against the 
recipient. 
BILATERAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
5. Non-
Competition Clause 
(usually explicit) 
 
FIDUCIARY 
a) 
harmonisation 
with the 
social matrix  
b) 
preservation 
of relation 
c) substantial 
fairness 
a) harmonisation with the social 
matrix  
b) preservation of relation 
c) contractual solidarity 
d) creation and restraint of power 
e) reciprocity 
f) harmonisation of relational 
conflict 
g) supracontract norms 
This clause directly derives from the 
provider’s fiduciary duties, is essential for 
the building of a relation of mutual trust and 
cooperation and is expressed by a mutual 
promise that none party will abuse the 
relation in order to promote its own benefits 
against the other party. 
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APPENDIX B 
 MATRIX OF OBLIGATIONS AND NORMS’ APPEARANCES 
4 Norms 
System 
SATISFYING PERFORMANCE 
EXPECTATIONS 
PRESERVATION OF THE 
RELATION 
HARMONISATION 
WITH THE SOCIAL 
MATRIX 
SUBSTANTIAL FAIRNESS  
McNeil’s 
Norms 
System/ 
Obligations 
Implem
entation 
of 
Plannin
g 
Role 
Integrit
y 
Effectuatio
n of 
Consent 
Creation 
and 
Restraint 
of Power 
Contrac
tual 
Solidari
ty 
Preserv
ation of 
the 
Relatio
n 
Harmonisa
tion of the 
Relational 
Conflict 
Harmonisa
tion with 
the Social 
Matrix 
Supracont
ract Norms 
Recipro
city 
Creation 
and 
Restraint 
of Power 
Proprie
ty of 
Means 
Flexibility
x x x x x x     x  1. Provider’s 
Integration in 
Recipient’s 
Structure 
x x   
 
 x   x x x   x   2.Fee 
Payment 
based on 
Provider’s 
Performance 
x x  x 
x 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 Recipient’s 
Obligations 2 2 0 1 
1 
x x   x x       3.Know-how 
Transfer x x   
 
x x   x x       4.Obligation 
of Staff 
Training x x   
 
x x x x x x   x x x  5.Obligation 
of Recipient’s 
Integration in 
Provider’s 
Business 
Networks 
x x x x 
 
    x x x x x    6.Obligation 
of Respect for 
the 
Philosophy 
and the Scope 
of the 
Enterprise 
 x x  
 
 x   x x    x   7.Preservatio
n of the 
Interests of 
the Recipient 
which are not 
related to the 
Contract 
x x  x 
 
3 4 1 1 5 5 1 1 2 2 1 0 Provider’s 
Obligations 4 5 2 2 
0 
4 6 2 2 7 7 2 1 2 3 2 0 UNILATERAL 
OBLIGATION
S 6 7 2 3 
1 
 x   x x  x  x   8.Obligation 
of 
Confidentialit
y 
x x x x 
 
 x   x x    x  x 9.Obligation 
for Provision 
of Information x x  x 
 
 x x x x x x x x x x x 10.Prohibitio
n of Rights 
and Liability 
Transfer 
x x x x 
 
  x x x x x x  x x x 11.Collaborat
ion 
Obligations x x x x 
x 
   x x x x x x x x  12.Non-
Competition 
Clause x x x x 
 
0 3 2 3 5 5 3 4 2 5 3 3 BILATERAL 
OBLIGATION
S 4 5 4 5 
1 
4 9 4 5 12 12 5 5 4 8 5 3 TOTAL 
10 12 6 8 
2 
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